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SUMMARY 
The 20-year success of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and world chemical 
disarmament has been marred by very sudden and unexpected re-emergence of chemical 
weapons (CWs) in the modern day battlefield, as well as them being used a tool in high-
profile assassinations and assassination attempts. The international community has proven 
to be very limited in its capability to react and respond to the emerging CWC treaty 
violations, primarily due to the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council 
(UN SC) actively employing their veto powers to prevent the UN SC from adopting any 
decisions that conflict with the views and interest of the said permanent member states.  
In July 2018, the Conference of the States Parties (CSP) of the international organisation 
implementing the CWC, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW) authorised the OPCW Director-general (DG) to put in place arrangements to 
identify the perpetrators of chemical attacks in the Syria, in cases where CW use has been 
previously confirmed by OPCW fact-finding missions. The decision, adopted by a two-
thirds majority vote, meant that the OPCW, previously concentrated on politically very 
neutral technical expertise approach and unequivocal analysis to proof the presence or 
absence of chemical warfare agents only, would start looking for identifying the origin of 
the CWs used, with the objective of identifying those responsible for using CWs.  
This study discusses the question whether the attribution of responsibility to the 
perpetrators of CWs use in the Syrian Arab Republic, as outlined in the CSP decision, is 
within the authority and scope of activities of the OPCW. The study question is approached 
in the broader context of powers of international organisations, but the main focus and 
primary source of the study is the CWC treaty text. The treaty text is examined regarding 
the powers and functions of the OPCW and its main organs, with the purpose of finding out 
the treaty provisions on investigating alleged use of CWs, and the OPCW powers to 
establish that a treaty violation has occurred. Furthermore, the decision and the mechanism 
it proposes are compared to the procedural and voting requirements of the OPCW. The 
amendment and dispute settlement processes outlined in the treaty are discussed. Finally, 
this study examines whether the attribution mechanism, as laid out in the decision, is in line 
with the division of OPCW tasks, and the responsibilities, tasks and authority of the United 
Nations, those of the UN Security Council in particular. 
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As stated in the Preamble of the treaty, the objective of the CWC is to exclude completely 
the possibility of the use of CWs. The objective of the treaty is reached through its 
implementation, for the purpose of which the OPCW was created. One of the distinctive 
hallmarks of the CWC, and the most significant part of its implementation, is its 
comprehensive mechanism for verification of compliance. Establishing compliance of a 
treaty state party in alleged use cases requires the power to conclude whether the state party 
has used CWs or not. Therefore, by necessary implication, the power to attribute CW use to 
a CWC state party should be well within the authority and scope of action of the OPCW.  
The CWC establishes mechanisms for investigating alleged CW use in Article IX, that 
deals with clarifying and resolving cases of non-compliance, as well as in Article X that 
concerns with assistance in cases CWs have been used against a CWC state party. These 
investigations are carried out using detailed procedures set out in the Part XI of the 
Verification Annex. Investigating alleged use pursuant to Article IX via a challenge 
inspection, initiated by a CWC state party, has the endpoint of the OPCW Executive 
Council reaching a conclusion whether any non-compliance has occurred. The CWC 
explicitly mentions that the alleged use investigation process is to be utilised to identify the 
origin of any chemical weapons used, if possible. Attribution of responsibility through the 
technical investigative actions of the OPCW seems therefore a self-evident part of the 
process of establishing non-compliance in cases of alleged use. However, the mechanism 
established by the CSP decision does not follow the core processes described in the CWC, 
leaving room for political debate and division among the OPCW member states. 
The attribution mechanism as outlined in the CSP decision can be seen to follow closely the 
mandate, as well as the tasks, duties and responsibilities allocated to different OPCW 
organs in the treaty. In addition, the OPCW considers all rules and procedural modalities 
followed by the CWC states parties at session of the CSP that adopted the decision. 
However, the CWC states parties maintain very divided opinions on the subject of the 
OPCW establishing such a mechanism for attribution of CW use, and the adoption of the 
CSP decision has created an obvious situation of dispute on the application of the CWC. 
Formal dispute settlement initiatives have not been made, but the dispute settlement 
mechanisms described in CWC Article XIV as well as the possibility to ask for the 
International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the subject remain an option. Formal 
amendment of the treaty according to CWC article XV to resolve this debate is likely not 
possible given the lack of common will among the states parties to the CWC. 
The CSP decision to establish the mechanism does not refer to any actions after the CW use 
is attributed to the perpetrators through these activities, other than reporting the findings to 
the relevant OPCW organs and UN entities. This implies that these activities are to be kept 
within the statutory powers of the OPCW, with the possible measures available to the 
OPCW limited to those listed in CWC Article XII, and referring further action to the United 
Nations. It can therefore be seen, that the OPCW assuming these activities does not 
inherently overlap with the responsibilities, tasks and authority of the UN, and special 
responsibilities of the UN Security Council concerning international peace and security. 
AVAINSANAT 
Chemical disarmament, international law, investigating alleged CW use, chemical warfare 
agents, Chemical Weapons Convention, the OPCW, treaty law. 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Kemiallisten aseiden kehittämisen, tuotannon, varastoinnin ja käytön kieltämistä sekä 
niiden hävittämistä koskevan yleissopimuksen (jäljempänä ”yleissopimus”) sekä hyvin 
edistyneen maailmanlaajuisen kemiallisen aseriisunnan 20 vuoden mittainen menestystarina 
on vastatuulessa kemiallisten aseiden palattua yllättäen ja odottamatta maailman 
taistelukentille. Kemiallisia taisteluaineita on viime vuosien aikana käytetty myös 
salamurhien ja niiden yritysten välineinä. Kansainvälinen yhteisö on osoittautunut varsin 
rajoittuneeksi kyvyltään vastata sopimusrikkomuksiin. Tähän on osaltaan vaikuttanut 
Yhdistyneitten Kansakuntien (YK) turvallisuusneuvoston pysyvien jäsenmaiden aktiivinen 
halu pysäyttää veto-oikeudellaan kaikki pysyvien jäsenmaiden näkemysten ja etujen 
vastaiset päätökset neuvoston kokouksissa. 
Heinäkuussa 2018 yleissopimusta toimeenpanevan kansainvälisen järjestön, Kemiallisten 
aseiden kieltojärjestön (jäljempänä ”OPCW”) Sopimusvaltioiden Konferenssi (jäljempänä 
“Konferenssi”) valtuutti OPCW:n Teknisen sihteeristön pääjohtajan luomaan järjestelyt 
kemiallisia aseita käyttäneiden tahojen tunnistamiseksi Syyriassa niissä tapauksissa, joissa 
kemiallisten aseiden käyttö oli jo aiemmin todennettu OPCW:n tosiasioiden 
selvittämisoperaatioissa. Tämä päätös hyväksyttiin kahden kolmanneksen enemmistöllä 
läsnä olevista ja äänestävistä jäsenvaltioista. Päätös tarkoitti sitä, että OPCW, jonka on 
aiemmin keskittynyt tarkastustoimissaan lähinnä kemiallisten taisteluaineiden läsnäolon 
toteamiseen tai poissulkemiseen, alkaisi tutkia väitetyn kemiallisen aseen käytön tapauksia 
päämääränä kemiallisten taisteluaineiden alkuperän, ja sitä kautta käyttäjän identiteetin 
selville saaminen.   
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan sitä, kuuluuko Konferenssin päätöksen mukainen 
toiminta kemiallisen aseen käyttöön syyllistyneiden tunnistamiseksi OPCW:n toimivallan 
ja tehtävien piiriin. Tutkimuskysymystä lähestytään tutkimuksessa kansainvälisten 
järjestöjen toimivallan laajemmassa kontekstissa, mutta tutkimuksen keskipisteenä ja 
ensisijaisena lähteenä on yleissopimuksen teksti. Yleissopimuksen tekstiä tutkitaan ja 
tulkitaan sen selvittämiseksi, mitä yleissopimuksessa sanotaan OPCW:n ja sen toimielinten 
toimivaltuuksista ja tehtävistä, keskittyen OPCW:n toimivaltuuksiin ja tehtäviin liittyen 
kemiallisten aseiden väitetyn käytön tapauksiin, ja OPCW:n toimivaltaan todeta, että 
sopimusrikkomus on tapahtunut. Konferenssissa tehdyn päätöksen tekoprosessia ja 
päätöksessä kuvattuja järjestelyjä verrataan yleissopimuksessa linjattuihin 
menettelytapoihin. Lisäksi tarkastellaan sitä, miten yleissopimusta koskevien riitojen 
ratkaisua ja yleissopimukseen tehtäviä lisäyksiä on käsitelty sopimustekstissä. Lopuksi 
tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan OPCW:n vastuualueiden ja YK:n vastuualueiden rajapintoja ja 
päätöksen mukaisen tutkimusmekanismin luomisen vaikutuksia niihin.  
Yleissopimuksen johdantoluvussa todetaan, että yleissopimuksen päämääränä on koko 
ihmiskunnan edun vuoksi täydellisesti poistaa kemiallisten aseiden käytön mahdollisuus. 
Yleissopimuksen päämäärä saavutetaan täytäntöönpanemalla yleissopimuksen määräykset, 
mitä varten sopimusvaltiot perustivat Kemiallisten aseiden kieltojärjestön. Yksi 
yleissopimuksen poikkeuksellista piirteistä valtiosopimuksena on sen sisältämä sopimuksen 
täytäntöönpanoa ja todentamista koskeva mekanismi. Väitetyn kemiallisen aseen käytön 
tapauksissa sopimuksen noudattamisen todentaminen vaatii sen, että OPCW pystyy 
tekemään päätöksen, onko sopimusvaltio käyttänyt kemiallisia aseita vai ei. 
Kansainvälisten järjestöjen implisiittistä toimivaltaa koskevan tulkinnan mukaisesti 
voidaan siis nähdä, että OPCW:lla pitäisi olla toimivalta tutkia väitetyn käytön tapauksia 
päämääränä tunnistaa kemiallisen aseen käyttöön syyllistynyt taho. 
Väitetyn kemiallisen aseen käytön tapausten tutkimista käsitellään yleissopimuksen 
Artiklassa IX, Neuvottelut, yhteistyö ja tosiasioiden selvittäminen, sekä Artiklassa X, Apu 
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ja suojautuminen kemiallisilta aseilta. Väitetyn käytön tutkimuksissa käytetyt menetelmät ja 
toimintatavat luetellaan yleissopimuksen Täytäntöönpanoa ja todentamista koskevan 
liitteen, ”Todentamisliitteen” osassa XI. Väitetyn käytön tapauksen tutkimisen päämääränä 
ja päätepisteenä, kun se tapahtuu Artiklan IX perusteella, on OPCW:n Hallintoneuvoston 
tekemä päätös siitä, onko yleissopimuksen määräyksiä jätetty noudattamatta. Yleissopimus 
mainitsee lisäksi eksplisiittisesti, että väitetyn käytön tapausten tutkimusprosessin aikana 
hankitut tiedot, joilla voitaisiin tunnistaa käytettyjen kemiallisten aseiden alkuperä, nämä 
tiedot on liitettävä tutkimuksen raportointiin. Myös yleissopimuksen tekstin perusteella 
kemiallisen aseen käyttöön syyllistyneen tahon selvittämisen voidaan siis väitetyn käytön 
tapauksissa katsoa kuuluvan osaksi sopimuksen täytäntöönpanoa ja todentamista koskevia 
toimia. Konferenssin päätöksen kuvaama mekanismi ei kuitenkaan tarkkaan noudata 
yleissopimuksessa kuvattuja prosesseja, mikä jättää mahdollisuuden erilaisille tulkinnoille, 
ja lisää jäsenvaltioiden kiistelyä yleissopimuksen tulkinnasta asiassa.  
Tarkasteltaessa yleissopimuksessa linjattuja OPCW:n ja sen toimielinten tehtäviä ja 
toimintoja voidaan Konferenssin tekemän päätöksen kuvaavan menkanismin nähdä 
noudattavan näitä hyvin. OPCW:n mielestä Konferenssi on noudattanut päätöstä tehdessään 
yleissopimuksessa määriteltyjä menettelytapoja ja päätöksentekoa. Yleissopimuksen 
jäsenvaltioilla on kuitenkin edelleen jyrkästi keskenään eroavia mielipiteitä Konferenssin 
päätöksen mukaisesta OPCW:n roolista kemiallisen aseen käyttöön syyllistyneiden tahojen 
tunnistamisessa. Tämä on synnyttänyt yleissopimuksen soveltamista ja tulkintaa koskevan 
ilmeisen riitatilanteen. Muodollisia aloitteita riitatilanteen ratkaisemiseksi ei ole tehty, 
mutta yleissopimuksen Artiklan XIV kuvaamat riitojen ratkaisumekanismit olisivat 
käytettävissä tilanteen selvittämiseksi. OPCW:n Hallintoneuvostolla ja Sopimusvaltioiden 
Konferenssilla on mahdollisuus kysyä myös Kansainvälisen tuomioistuimen neuvoa-
antavaa mielipidettä koskien järjestön toimivaltaan kuuluvia oikeudellisia kysymyksiä. 
Muodollinen yleissopimuksen muutosprosessi, jonka tarkoituksena olisi selkeyttää 
OPCW:n toimivaltaa tutkimusaiheen kysymyksessä, ei ole mahdollinen sopimusvaltioiden 
yhteisen näkemyksen puuttuessa.  
Konferenssin tekemä päätös tutkia väitettyjä kemiallisen aseen käyttötapauksia päämääränä 
käyttöön syyllistyneiden tahojen tunnistaminen ei ota kantaa siihen mitä tapahtuu, kun 
nämä tahot on tunnistettu OPCW:n suorittamien teknisten tutkimuksien kautta. 
Konferenssin päätös viittaa ainoastaan tulosten raportointiin relevanteille OPCW:n ja YK:n 
toimielimille. Tämä pitää näiden löydösten jälkeiset toimenpiteet yleissopimuksen 
määrittämien OPCW:n ja sen toimielinten tehtävien ja toimivallan sisällä. OPCW:n 
mahdolliset toimenpiteet tilanteiden oikaisemiseksi ja sopimuksen noudattamisen 
varmistamiseksi, mukaan lukien pakotteet, on lueteltu yleissopimuksen Artiklassa XII. 
Konferenssi voi hallintoneuvoston suosituksesta muun muassa rajoittaa tai peruuttaa 
yleissopimuksesta kyseiselle valtiolle seuraavat oikeudet ja erioikeudet, mutta erityisen 
vakavissa tapauksissa Konferenssin on saatettava asia ja siihen liittyvät tosiseikat sekä 
johtopäätökset YK:n yleiskokouksen ja turvallisuusneuvoston tietoon. Voidaan siis nähdä, 
että päätöksen luoma kemiallisten aseiden käyttäjien tunnistusmekanismi noudattaa YK:n 
ja OPCW:n vastuualueiden perinteisiä rajapintoja eikä kyseenalaista turvallisuusneuvoston 
erityisasemaa ja -oikeuksia kansainvälisen turvallisuuden ja rauhan ylläpitäjänä.  
AVAINSANAT 
Aseriisunta, kansainvälinen oikeus, kemialliset taisteluaineet, kemiallisen aseen väitetty 
käyttö, Kemiallisten aseiden kieltämistä koskeva yleissopimus, Kemiallisten aseiden 
kieltojärjestö. 
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1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1 The Chemical Weapons Convention 
 
 
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of 
Chemical Weapons, and on Their Destruction, commonly referred to as the Chemical 
Weapons Convention or the CWC, entered into force on 29th of April 1997. The CWC is an 
international disarmament treaty that mandates the destruction and prohibition of all chemical 
weapons and facilities related to them, and bans the use of any toxic chemical as a weapon. 
The CWC also provides for restrictions on international trade of toxic chemicals and their 
precursors. The convention’s verification and monitoring measures involve submissions of 
declarations regarding listed chemicals, and inspections of the facilities where these chemicals 
are produced1. The implementation of its provisions and cooperation between the state parties 
is carried out by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the OPCW. 
CWC can be considered to be a highly successful disarmament treaty, as it covers and bans a 
whole category of weapons of mass destruction and at present, is one of the most ratified 
international treaties2. CWC has 193 state parties and one signatory member state (Israel), the 
most recent state party to accede to the convention being Palestine (17.5.2018)3. Only three of 
the 193 member states of the United Nations (UN) have not ratified the treaty. These are 
Egypt, North Korea, and South Sudan. Eight states4 have declared themselves as chemical 
weapons (CWs) possessor states either when entering the CWC, or while being bound by the 
treaty. In addition, 14 states parties have declared the possession of a total of 97 chemical 
weapons production facilities (CWPFs)5.  
The treaty mandates the destruction of CWs as well as CWPFs within 10 years of the treaty 
entering into force, with the possibility of extending this timeline with 5 years under certain 
circumstances. Several countries did not meet these disarmament deadlines, most recent being 
in 2012 counting from the first day the treaty entered into force and employing the 5-year 
extension. However, in 2020, only one CWC state party (USA) was still in possession of 
                                            
1 OPCW, 2017b. The OPCW fact sheet - Origins of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the OPCW. 
2 UN, 2016. Treaties deposited with the UN secretary-general close to universal participation. 
3 OPCW, 2018. Evolution of the status of participation in the convention. 
4 USA, Russia, Libya, India, Albania, Syria, Iraq and a country that wishes itself to be referred just as A State 
Party in the OPCW documents 
5 OPCW AR, 2017. Report of the OPCW on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction in 2016. 
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CWAs declared under the CWC6, with the target date for destruction of all remaining CWAs 
set for September 2023. 68125 tonnes representing 97 % of the world’s total declared 
stockpiles of category 1 CWAs had been destroyed under the verification regime of the 
OPCW by the end of 20187, highlighting the success of this arms control treaty and its 
implementing organisation. By the end of 2018, all 97 of the CWPFs declared under the 
convention had been certified as having been destroyed, or converted for purposes not 
prohibited by the CWC8. 
 
 
1.1.1 The CWC treaty regime 
 
 
The preamble of the convention states the aims of the convention and the contexts to which it 
is aimed to contribute: 
… Determined for the sake of all mankind to exclude completely the possibility of the use of 
chemical weapons through the implementation of the provisions of the Convention…” 
 
The provisions of the treaty contribute to three arms control regimes - disarmament, 
verification of compliance, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). 
The convention contains 24 Articles, as well as three annexes: Annex on chemicals; Annex on 
implementation and verification; and Annex on the protection of confidential information. 
These are listed in Table I. The CWC represents a total ban of all chemical weapons, 
considering all toxic chemicals as chemical weapons, unless the intended purpose of their use 
is not prohibited by the convention9. This principle, called the general purpose criterion, 
ensures the comprehensive and general prohibition of weapons that use toxic chemicals, as 
well as toxic chemicals as a method of warfare. 
                                            
6 OPCW AR, 2019. Report of the OPCW on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction in 2018. 
7 OPCW, 2020. The OPCW website. 
8 OPCW AR, 2019. 
9 Article II (1) (a) of the CWC: “1. “Chemical Weapons" means the following, together or separately: (a) Toxic 
chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long 
as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes;” OPCW, 2005 
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Table I: The Articles and Annexes of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons, and on Their Destruction10. 
 
The Preamble and the Articles The Annexes  
Preamble Annex on chemicals 
I: General obligations  Annex on implementation and verification 
II: Definitions and criteria Annex on the protection of confidential information 
III: Declarations  
IV: Chemical weapons  
V: Chemical weapons production facilities  
VI: Activities not prohibited under this convention  
VII: National implementation measures  
VIII: The organization  
IX: Consultations, cooperation and fact-finding  
X: Assistance and protection against chemical weapons  
XI: Economic and technological development  
XII: Measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, 
including sanctions 
 
XIII: Relation to other international agreements  
XIV: Settlement of disputes  
XV: Amendments  
XVI: Duration and withdrawal  
XVII: Status of the annexes  
XVIII: Signature  
XIX: Ratification  
XX: Accession  
XXI: Entry into force  
XXII: Reservations  
XXIII: Depositary  
XXIV: Authentic texts  
 
The scope of the CWC and its prohibitions are presented in Articles I and II. Article I sets out 
the obligations for the convention states parties to never use, develop, produce, stockpile or 
transfer CWs11, excluding any possibility to gain exceptions from these stipulations. In Article 
II, the aforementioned general-purpose criterion is created, and the definition of chemical 
weapons is presented. These prohibitions, binding the states parties (SPs) of the treaty, are 
extended to include natural and legal persons that are under the jurisdiction of a SP in Article 
VII on national implementation measures12. 
The practical steps of CW disarmament required from the CWC SPs are laid out in the CWC 
Articles III, IV and V. The first phase of disarmament are the declarations, where data on 
existing CWs and chemical weapons production facilities, as well as other facilities related to 
                                            
10 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical 
Weapons, and on Their Destruction. OPCW, 2005. From the table of contents. 
11 Article I (1): “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances: (a) To develop, 
produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical 
weapons to anyone; (b) To use chemical weapons; (c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical 
weapons; (d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State 
Party under this Convention.” OPCW, 2005 
12 Article VII (1) (a): “Each State Party shall … (a) Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or 
in any other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity 
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention…” OPCW, 2005 
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development of CWs, are declared to the OPCW13. The process of elimination of the declared 
CWs and facilities, as well as the requirements to provide unhindered access to the 
verification measures described in the convention, including on-site inspections, are set out in 
CWC Articles IV and V. 
 
 
1.1.2 The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW  
 
The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW is established in the CWC 
Article VIII entitled the Organization. All States Parties (SPs) to the CWC are automatically 
members of the OPCW, and a CWC state party can not be deprived of its membership of the 
OPCW14. The OPCW has three main bodies defined in the convention itself: the Conference 
of the States Parties (CSP), the Executive Council (EC) and the Technical Secretariat (TS)15. 
The Conference of States Parties is the principal organ of the OPCW and oversees the 
implementation of the CWC, promotes its goals, and reviews compliance with the treaty. It 
also oversees the activities of the EC and TS. The Executive Council is the executive organ of 
the OPCW, consisting of 41 OPCW member states that are elected by the CSP, and rotated 
every two years. The EC is subordinated to the CSP, and supervises the activities of the TS 
together with the CSP. The OPCW Technical Secretariat is a technical and professional body 
that assists the CSP and the EC in performing their tasks, and carries out the CWC’s 
verification measures16. The OPCW organs and subsidiary bodies are presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. OPCW organs and subsidiary bodies. Data from OPCW, 2017c. 
 
                                            
13 Article III (1-2), OPCW, 2005 
14 Article VIII (2), OPCW, 2005 
15 Article VIII (4), OPCW, 2005  
16 OPCW, 2017c. OPCW fact sheet - The structure of the OPCW. 
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The OPCW headquarters are located in the Hague, Netherlands. While the CSP and the EC 
comprise delegates of the member states to the organisation and convene in sessions on 
regular intervals, the TS holds a permanent staff of about 500 people working at the Hague 
headquarters. Around 60 per cent of the TS staff, recruited from over 80 CWC SPs, are 
employed in the Inspectorate and the Verification divisions of the TS. The Inspectorate 
division of the TS is involved in carrying out the inspections required by the CWC of both 
military and commercial facilities around the world. The Verification division analyses the 
information collected during inspections, as well as assesses the data submitted by OPCW 
member states in their declarations. The organisation’s budget for 2020 is 70 958 760 euros.17 
The Director-General (OPCW DG) is the head of the TS and its chief administrative officer. 
The OPCW DG is appointed by the CSP for a term of four years, renewable for one further 
term. The OPCW DG is responsible for organising and functions of the Scientific advisory 
board, referred to in Article VIII (21) (h). The OPCW DG has also powers to establish 
temporary working groups of scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific 
issues. In the performance of their duties, the OPCW DG or any other OPCW members of the 
staff are responsible only to the CSP and the EC, and cannot seek or receive instructions from 
any government or from any other source external to the organisation.18 The organisation has 
the legal capacity and the privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its 
functions. They are established in the CWC Article VIII, part E19. The organisation enjoys 
these privileges and immunities on the territory and in any other place under the jurisdiction or 
control of a CWC state party, as stated in Article VIII (48). 
 
 
1.1.2.1 The Conference of the States Parties, CSP  
 
The composition, procedures and decision-making, as well as the powers and functions of the 
Conference of the States Parties, CSP, are set out in CWC Article VIII, paragraphs 9 through 
22. The CSP is the principal, decision-making organ of the OPCW, responsible for 
considering and adopting the report, programme and budget of the OPCW20, as well as having 
the power to consider, make recommendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or 
                                            
17 OPCW, 2017c. OPCW fact sheet - The structure of the OPCW.also OPCW, 2020. OPCW by the numbers 
18 Article VIII (43-46), OPCW, 2005 
19 Article VIII (48-51), OPCW, 2005 
20 Article VIII (21) (a), OPCW, 2005 
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issues within the scope of the CWC. This decision-making power includes the matters relating 
to the powers and functions of the EC and the TS21. 
The CWC is built on the principles of equality, and all CWC states have one vote at the 
CSP22. The CSP meets in its regular sessions annually for one week in The Hague. In addition 
to the yearly CSP sessions, special sessions (SS) of the conference can be organised under the 
following circumstances: when decided by the CSP, when requested by the executive council, 
or when requested by one third of all CWC states parties. The CSP must also meet to consider 
any proposed amendments to the CWC. Since 2003, the CSP has also organised regular 
special sessions at five-year intervals to review the operation of the CWC.23 
 
 
1.2 The CWC and the OPCW in the context of international law 
 
The customary norm to prohibit the use of poisons as a method of warfare has evolved over 
the centuries. Toxic chemicals have been used as a method of warfare throughout the known 
history; however, the use of poison as a weapon has also long been associated with 
unnecessary and inhumane cruelty and suffering. Using chemical weapons has therefore been 
regarded as something that is below the definition of ‘civilised’ battle, and banning chemical 
weapons has taken a prominent position in since the earliest disarmament agreements. The 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 190724, and the Geneva Protocol in 1925 distilled the 
international customary law emerging from these general sentiments into treaty law.25  
After the end of WWII, the world was mainly focused on the threat of nuclear war. The 
weapons of mass destruction disarmament efforts therefore took decades to start receiving 
attention again. However, in 1968, discussions on disarmament of biological and chemical 
weapons were begun at the Geneva disarmament conference. These discussions lead 
eventually to the birth of Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) that opened for 
                                            
21 Article VIII (19), OPCW, 2005 
22 Article VIII (9), OPCW, 2005 
23 OPCW, 2020; The CSP special sessions are held every five years to undertake reviews of the operation of the 
convention and to take into account any relevant scientific and technological developments. These special 
sessions are set out in Article VIII (12) and Article VIII (22) of the CWC, OPCW, 2005 
24 The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 were the first multilateral treaties that addressed the conduct of 
warfare. The Hague Convention from 1899 included a declaration on the use of projectiles the object of which is 
the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases, from which the contracting powers agreed to abstain. The 1907 
Convention (IV) on Laws and Customs of War on Land (II) Hostilities (I) Means of injuring the enemy, sieges, 
and bombardments, Article 23 states that it is especially forbidden to employ poison or poisoned weapons. Yale, 
2008. The Avalon project. Documents in law, history and diplomacy. 
25 The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was signed at Geneva in 17th June 1925 and it entered into force on 8th 
February 1928. Also OPCW, 2017c; OPCW, 2020, History: Chemical Weapons Convention Negotiations. 
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signature in 1972. The BTWC obliged its state parties to continue negotiations on chemical 
weapons, with the goal of instituting measures mandating their destruction, and the 
prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling. Negotiations on chemical 
weapons convention proved to be slow.26  
In 1980, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) established a working group on 
chemical weapons, which, in 1984, was tasked of creating the outlines of a chemical weapons 
ban, paving way to the annually updated rolling text of the convention. The CD is a 
multilateral disarmament forum established in 1978. The terms of reference of the CD include 
multilateral arms control and disarmament problems. The CD meets in an annual session, and 
conducts its work by consensus. Its budget is included in that of the United Nations, and the 
CD reports to the United Nations General Assembly (UN GA) annually. In 1992, a draft 
convention on chemical weapons was adopted by the CD. Subsequently, the United Nations 
Secretary-General (UN SG), the depositary of the convention, was requested by the UN GA to 
open the convention for signature on 13 January 1993 in Paris. The convention was signed by 
130 countries during the three-day Paris signing conference.27 
The link between the CWC and the international humanitarian law is clear. The obligations 
assumed under, and the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 
BTWC of 1972 are reaffirmed in the preamble to the CWC28. However, the potential routes 
that would lead to eventual accountability for CW -related crimes are complicated. The 
International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction over persons with respect to war crimes, 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. Article 8 (2) (b) (xviii) of the 1998 ICC 
Statute states that “Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous 
liquids, materials or devices” is a war crime in international armed conflicts. Article 8 (2) (e) 
(xiv) of the ICC Statute as amended in 2010, extends this war crime definition to cover non-
international armed conflicts29. State responsibility is yet another thing. 
 
                                            
26 UNOG, 2020. The Biological Weapons Convention. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 
commonly known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), opened for signature in 1972 and 
entered into force in 1975; Also OPCW, 2020. History: Chemical Weapons Convention Negotiations 
27 UNOG, 2020. An introduction to the Conference on Disarmament; OPCW, 2020. History: Chemical Weapons 
Convention negotiations. In between the CD sessions, the questions regarding the scientific basis of the 
convention were researched in various institutions, discussion groups and scientific organisations. To mention a 
few, the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs has made a long-standing contribution to the 
chemical disarmament talks. In Finland, the CC (later CW) -project of the University of Helsinki was established 
to develop analytical methods to support chemical disarmament. After the project ended, the Finnish Institute for 
Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN) was established as an independent institute under 
the University of Helsinki.  
28 The CWC Preamble (3-6), OPCW, 2005 
29 ICC, 2010. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.  
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1.2.1 The CWC is a treaty 
 
An agreement is a consensual bond between two or more subjects of international law. This 
bond may be either express or tacit. An express bond can be embodied in a written instrument 
such as a treaty, or concluded orally. A tacit bond means that a state does not expressly 
participate in the agreement, but acts in a way that can be only interpreted in good faith as an 
acceptance of the agreement. A treaty is therefore a written instrument of express agreement 
between two or more subjects of international law.30 Treaties may be concluded between 
states, between states and international organisations, and between international 
organisations31. Since the end of the WWII, treaties have assumed an increasingly important 
place in international law. Unlike custom, whose precise requirements may often be unclear 
and whose evolution may take long periods of time, treaties provide their state parties with 
instant and clearly defined rights and obligations32. 
The 1969 Vienna convention on the law of treaties (VCLT) is a convention governing the 
rules of the creation and legal effects of treaties, and their interpretation. The VCLT originated 
as a statement of customary international law through collection of rules on treaty 
interpretation. The VCLT only applies to some treaties and not all agreements existing, and 
valid under international law, defining the scope of application in its article 2 (1) (a)33: 
 
“Treaty means an international agreement concluded between states in written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more 
related instruments and whatever its particular designation.” 
 
The principle of the binding nature of treaties is stated in Article 26 of the VCLT, under the 
heading ‘Pacta sunt servanda’, every treaty is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith. On the other hand, the Article 34 of the VCLT defines that a 
                                            
30 Kolb, 2017. The law of treaties. An introduction. Paperback edition 2017. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 
Cheltenham, UK. Ch II, Concept, p. 16 
31 Fitzmaurice in Evans (2018) International Law. 5th edition. Oxford University Press, UK. Ch 6, The practical 
working of the law of treaties, p.144 
32 Hall in McConville & Chui (Eds., 2017) Research methods for law. 2nd edition, Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh, UK. Ch 10, Researching international law, p. 255 
33 Article 2 (1) (a), The Vienna Convention On the Law of Treaties. VCLT, 1969; also Kolb, 2017. Ch II, 
Concept p. 21 
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state not party to a treaty is as a matter of treaty law in most cases under no obligation to 
comply with the obligations set therein34.  
Treaties are one of the clearest ways to bring into existence rules that are binding between two 
or more states. It should be noted, however, that legal relations produced by treaties have 
differences. Some treaties are dispositive, and their legal effects are realised as a whole 
immediately upon their conclusion. A good example of a dispositive treaty would be a treaty 
establishing an international boundary. Some treaties, however, are treaties establishing an 
evolving relationship where only certain core principles are spelled out, but parties are left to 
discuss the potentially arising details and problems. If consensus is not agreed, a dispute-
settlement body will decide on the outcome. Furthermore, some treaties consist of exchange 
of reciprocal promises regarding the parties’ future conduct, such as extradition treaties.35 
These differences have a profound effect on how treaties can be interpreted. With any non-
dispositive type of treaty, it is not feasible to find out what the parties actually agreed upon, by 
simply inspecting the treaty text. 
When a multilateral treaty is widely adhered to, and represents the views of the state parties as 
to universal legal principles, such treaties are said to be legislative, or law-making. That 
means they lay down standards of conduct common to all states parties. These kind of 
legislative treaties create rules binding on all states, whether or not they are actual parties to 
the treaty36. The CWC, approaching universal participation, can be considered to contribute in 
such a way to the formation of international customary law. 
 
 
1.2.2 The OPCW is an international organisation 
 
International organisations (IOs) coordinate efforts of states on issues of international 
relevance. IOs first emerged in the nineteenth century, evolving from multilateral conferences 
invested to deal with particular situations, to permanently working institutions around which 
member states meet regularly. Today, IOs perform a number of functions, such as providing 
forums for deliberating and discussing matters of common interest, as well as developing 
rules for matters of common interest, providing mechanisms for monitoring compliance with 
internationally agreed rules and policies, and providing forums for the resolution of 
international disputes. It is difficult to lay down an all-encompassing definition of an IO, 
                                            
34 Article 34 (1): “A treaty does not create either obligations of rights for a third state without its consent.” 
VCLT, 1969 
35 Lowe in Tams et al. (Eds., 2016) Research handbook on the law of treaties. Paperback edition 2016. Edward 
Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham, UK. Ch 1, The law of treaties; or, should this book exist? pp. 5-6 
36 Hall in McConville & Chui (2017) Ch 10, Researching international law p. 256 
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however, IOs are most commonly created between states, and on the basis of a treaty. The 
organisation must be established under international law. In addition, the definition of an IO 
usually includes possessing at least one organ, and having a will that is distinct from that of 
their member states. The “distinct will”, manifested in practise by at least one organ of the 
organisation being autonomous from the members or possessing the ability of operating on a 
majority basis, justifies the IOs having a separate legal personality.37 That an entity has an 
international legal personality means that the entity is a bearer of rights and duties derived 
from international law38.  
Legal principles concerning IO matters such as membership, competences, and financing are 
derived from the organisation’s own constituent instrument and practises. Furthermore, 
customary international law as well as treaties have created common principles that generally 
apply to all IOs. These common principles apply in the absence of contrary principles 
provided for in the law of the particular IO. The common principles concern matters such as 
the legal personality of IOs, implied competences, interpretation of constituent instruments, 
and the liability and responsibility of an IO and its member states.39 The Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between 
International Organizations from 198640 can be considered to be a statement of such 
customary international law. The treaty has not yet entered into force. 
The purposes, structure and competences of an IO as a whole, as well as the powers and 
functions granted to its particular organs, are set out in the treaty that establishes the 
organisation. In addition to the powers expressly conferred on IOs by their constituent treaties, 
IOs also possess powers that are implied. The doctrine of implied powers of IOs means, that 
IOs are deemed to have the powers that are essential for the organisation to perform their 
duties, even though they are not expressly provided for in the treaty establishing the 
organisation. These powers are not limited to those needed to carry out express functions of 
the organisation, but rather are implied whenever they are essential to the fulfilment of the 
organisation’s objectives and purpose. The doctrine emerged in the mid-20th century 
                                            
37 Klabbers, 2015. Advanced introduction to the law of international organisations. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 
Cheltenham, UK. Ch 1, The concept of international organization pp. 1-7; Akande in Evans (2018) Ch 8, 
International organizations pp. 227-230; Malanczuk, 1997. Akehurst’s modern introduction to international law. 
7th revised edition. Routledge, UK. Ch 6, International organizations, individuals, companies and groups pp. 92-
96 
38 Akande in Evans (2018) Ch 8, International organizations pp. 231-232. The international legal personality can 
be conferred to the IO by the express provisions of the treaty establishing it. The personality can also be deduced 
- either from will of the members in form of capacities, powers, rights and duties bestowed to the organisation, or 
from the concept that and international organisation has an international legal personality from the presence of 
criteria stated in the paragraph. 
39 Ibid. p. 230 
40 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between Interna-
tional Organizations. VCLTIO, 1986. 
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following the realisation that as IOs are given certain functions, purposes and objectives, they 
must possess certain powers to execute those, even when a situation arises that member states 
have never before considered. The doctrine has been applied by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) in a number of cases concerning the powers of the IOs, most prominent being the 
ICJ Advisory opinion on Certain expenses of the United Nations from 1962.41 
In general, IOs also have powers to make decisions relating to their scope of activity. These 
may be directed towards their members, or in rare cases, at third parties such as individuals or 
other non-state entities. Whether a particular decision is legally binding to its addressee 
depends on if the IO or its organ has been expressly or impliedly conferred with a power to 
take binding decisions. If the treaty establishing an international organisation provides that the 
organisation may adopt measures that bind the treaty member states, the states parties are 
obliged to comply with any such measures to the extent and manner described in the 
convention. Furthermore, the language of the decision must reveal an intention to issue a 
binding decision by the decision-making organ.42 An example of this is the UN, where the 
member states of the UN are obliged to carry out the binding decisions of the UN SC43. 
Although resolutions and acts of international organisations do not directly generate rules in 
the context of international law, they indirectly help to create such rules by providing useful 
and easily accessible evidence of opinio juris and therefore contribute to the emergence of 
rules of customary international law44. 
Few IOs have a judicial system that can adjudicate on the legality of acts of the organisation or 
its organs. If an IO makes a decision that is beyond its powers (ultra vires), the legal 
effectiveness of the decision can be questioned. A decision taken ultra vires can be considered 
to stand, unless it is set aside by a competent body. On the other hand, these kinds of decisions 
can be considered a nullity and of no effect at all, with the states free to depart from. In the 
Advisory opinion on Certain expenses of the United Nations, the ICJ determined that if an act 
of the UN organ is considered an invalid act, such invalidity would constitute the absolute 
nullity of the act. However, in the same opinion, the ICJ claimed that even if the activity is 
                                            
41 Akande in Evans (2018) Ch 8, International organizations pp. 339-242; Klabbers, 2015.  Ch 2, The legal 
existence of international organizations pp. 22-25; ICJ, 1962. Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, 
paragraph 2, of the Charter) Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C. J. Reports 1962, p. 151; Klabbers, 2015. Ch 
6, Accountability pp. 83-84 
42 Akande in Evans (2018) Ch 8, International organizations pp. 339-242; Hall in McConville & Chui (2017) Ch 
10, Researching international law p. 273 
43 Relevant Articles of the UN Charter dealing with this are Ch V, Article 23: “The Members of the United 
Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter.” and Ch XVI, Article 103: “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the 
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their 
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” 
44 Hall in McConville & Chui (2017) Ch 10, Researching international law p. 273 
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beyond the powers of a particular organ of an IO, it may still be in the within the powers of 
the organisation at large. In addition, the ICJ was of the opinion that each organ of an IO must 
decide for itself on the proper scope of its competences.45 
 
 
1.2.3 On state responsibility and attribution 
 
International law treats states as the basic units of the system. States are both the main 
subjects of the international law, as well as the entities whose choices and conduct generate 
positive international law. The choices and conduct of states are their practise, and the practise 
of states defines the emergence and evolution of norms of customary international law.46 A 
hallmark of a system of law is that its rules can be enforced against those who break them. As 
mentioned, states are the primary subjects of international law, and state responsibility is also 
the paradigm form of responsibility on the international plane. In addition, international 
organisations, individuals and companies have legal personalities, and as such are subjects of 
international law. Apart from the responsibility of IOs, however, the rules concerning the 
responsibility of the aforementioned under international law are less distinct, and no general 
regime of responsibility has developed to cover them.47  
The law of state responsibility deals with three general questions - whether there has been a 
breach by a state of an international obligation, what are the consequences of this breach and 
who, and in what ways, may respond to this breach or seek reparations due to it. A state can 
only be engaged by for breaches of international law, and for conduct that is internationally 
wrongful. What is a breach of international law by a state depends on the said state’s 
international obligations. These obligations may vary between states even under customary 
international law, but especially when treaties are concerned. The background assumptions 
underlying state responsibility - attribution, breach, excuses and consequences - and the basis 
on which specific state obligations exist, are set out in the 2001 International Law 
Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility on Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(ASRIWA).48  
                                            
45 ICJ, 1962; Also Akande in Evans (2018) Ch 8, International organizations pp. 241-243 
46 Hall in McConville & Chui (2017) Ch 10, Researching international law p. 258 
47 Crawford & Colleson in Evans (2018) Ch 14, The character and forms of international responsibility p. 416; 
Malanczuk, 1997. Ch 6, International organizations, individuals, companies and groups pp. 91-92 
48 Crawford & Colleson in Evans (2018) Ch 14, The character and forms of international responsibility pp. 415-
416 
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That a certain conduct is attributable to a state does not say anything about the legality of that 
conduct as such. Theeuwen49 discussed attribution in three different categories: a) Technical 
attribution: the outcome of a factual and technical investigation both in terms of who the 
likely perpetrator is and the degree of certainty with which this can be established; b) Political 
attribution: the decision whether or not to publicly and politically attribute a particular attack 
to a particular actor, without necessarily attaching legal consequences to this attribution; and 
c) Legal attribution: the decision to attribute certain conduct to a particular state with a view to 
invoking the responsibility of that state for an internationally wrongful act. The author argued 
in the view of ASRIWA articles that the purpose of legal attribution is to establish that the act 
considered as internationally wrongful emanates from a certain state for the purposes of state 
responsibility.  
State responsibility may be invoked by acts or omissions of any state organ, or officials. A 
state is liable for the acts of its officials even when they have disobeyed or exceeded their 
instructions, provided that the officials were acting under the apparent authority of the state, or 
if they have abused the powers and facilities placed at their disposal by the state. The rules of 
attribution under the Articles 4-11 of the ASRIWA specify the actors whose conduct may 
engage the responsibility of the state. In general, a state is not responsible for the acts of mobs 
or individuals. However, their acts may be attributable to state if the state acknowledges the 
acts as its own, or fails in some obligations to prevent the conduct.50  
 
 
1.3 Re-emerging chemical weapons threat in the 21st century 
 
1.3.1 Barrel bombs and perfume bottles 
 
 
The 20-year success of the CWC and world chemical disarmament has been marred by very 
sudden and unexpected return of CWs in the modern day battlefield, as well as the recurring 
appearance of CWAs in the news headlines. In addition to the battlefield use by various 
parties involved with the Syrian civil war, CWAs have recently been used as a tool in high-
profile assassinations and assassination attempts.  
                                            
49 Theeuwen, 2018. Attribution for the purposes of state responsibility. Netherlands Military Law Review p. 6 
50 ASRIWA, 2005; Malanczuk, 1997. Ch 17, State responsibility pp. 256-259; Crawford & Colleson in Evans 
(2018) Ch 14, The character and forms of international responsibility pp. 416-417 
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In 2017 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the People’s Democratic Republic of North Korea’s 
leader Kim Jong Un’s brother Kim Jong Nam was assassinated using nerve agent VX51. A 
former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter were poisoned in Salisbury, UK in early 
2018, using a CWA belonging to a group of nerve agents called the Novichoks52 that were 
originally developed in the 1970s - 1990s Soviet Union. Later in 2018, the open-source 
intelligence organisation Bellingcat provided evidence that two persons carrying out the 
Salisbury attack were intelligence officers of the Russian Armed Forces intelligence service 
GU53. In addition to the original target Mr. Skripal and his daughter, both of whom survived 
the attack despite severe toxicity symptoms, the incident resulted in two unintended casualties 
due to a passer-by finding the vessel the attackers used to transport the Novichok poison, a 
small perfume bottle, and giving the bottle to his partner. The partner sprayed the contents of 
the bottle onto her hands, developed symptoms within 15 minutes and died a week later at a 
hospital. The finder got poisoned while handling the bottle, but survived.54 
In February 2019, Bellingcat released additional intelligence findings55 that connected a third 
person also involved in the 2018 Salisbury attack to previous poisoning incident of a 
Bulgarian arms trader and his son. In April 2015, a Bulgarian arms manufacturer and his son 
were severely affected by a yet-unidentified poison during a dinner event with foreign trade 
partners. Biological samples taken from the victims were confirmed to contain traces of 
organophosphate type (nerve-agent or pesticide) substances by analysis in an OPCW 
designated laboratory. The person suspected of carrying out the Salisbury attack travelled 
multiple times to Bulgaria during 2015, including a trip days before the incident. Again, 
Bellingcat provided detailed proof that the person in question is a GU officer. 
Even more worrisome development concerns the return of CWs in the battlefield use. 
Repeated incidents of CW use have since 2012 been reported as a part of the armed conflict in 
the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR). At that time, the SAR was not a state party to the CWC. 
Syria, mediated by Russia, ratified the CWC in 201356 following the world reaction to the re-
emerging use of these banned weapons, and to stop the impending US military intervention in 
the conflict. SAR accession to the CWC included the declaration of the SAR CWA stockpile 
                                            
51 OPCW, 2017. OPCW Executive Council condemns chemical weapons use in fatal incident in Malaysia. 
OPCW Press release 10.3.2017 
52 UK Prime Minister, 2018. Oral statement to Parliament. PM Commons statement on Salisbury incident: 12 
March 2018 
53 Bellingcat, 2018. Skripal suspects confirmed as GRU operatives: Prior European operations disclosed. 
54 BBC, 2018. Novichok: Victim found poison bottle in branded box. 
55 Bellingcat, 2019. Third suspect in Skripal poisoning identified as Denis Sergeev, high-ranking GRU officer. 
56 OPCW, 2013. Syria’s accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention enters into force. OPCW Press release 
14.10.2013. 
        
 
21
to the OPCW, followed by its destruction57. In addition, the SAR has since destroyed all its 
declared 27 chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs), the destruction having been 
verified by the OPCW TS58. However, the OPCW has also concluded that there were gaps, 
inconsistencies and discrepancies in the initial SAR CWA declaration, and its subsequent 
submissions to the OPCW59. 
Attacks using chlorine gas and other CWAs such as nerve agents have continued in Syria until 
the present day. On 4th April 2017, a chemical attack was carried out in Khan Shaykhun area 
in the Idlib province of the SAR. There, tens of civilians died and further hundreds got 
poisoned by chemicals deployed using a barrel bomb dropped from an aircraft60. Biomedical 
samples taken from the victims by OPCW representatives confirmed that the Khan Shaykhun 
victims were exposed to a chemical warfare agent - a nerve gas sarin61.  
Recently, Schneider and Lütkefend62 and al Maghafi63 have compiled comprehensive reports 
on the total scale and logic of CW use during the Syrian conflict. According to al Maghafi 
report there was credible evidence to be confident that a chemical weapon had been used in at 
least 106 incidents between 2014 and 2018. Schneider and Lütkefend concluded in their 
research that the extent of CW use in Syria is even higher than other sources have considered, 
and there have been at least 336 chemical weapons attacks over the course of the Syrian civil 
war. The authors attributed 98 percent of these attacks to the Assad regime, with the Islamic 
State group being responsible for the rest.  
Chlorine munitions derived from conventional “barrel” or “lob” bombs have accounted for at 
least 89 per cent of all chemical attacks throughout the Syrian war64. Chlorine gas was the first 
chemical weapon used at a large scale, and its use begun already during the World War I. 
Chlorine gas is also an ordinary industrial chemical and as such, has many everyday practical 
uses and is not classified as a CWA. However, the CWC in its Article II comprehensively 
bans the use of all poisonous substances as a weapon in war65. The use of chlorine gas as a 
CW is difficult to prove afterwards even using the most modern technology, as chlorine 
                                            
57 OPCW, 2014b. OPCW maritime operation completes deliveries of Syrian chemicals to commercial destruction 
facilities. OPCW Press release 24.7.2014. 
58 OPCW EC, 2020. Report by the director-general. Progress in the implementation of decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 on 
addressing the threat from chemical weapons use. 
59 OPCW EC, 2016. Decision. Report by the director-general regarding the declaration and related submissions 
by the Syrian Arab Republic. 
60 BBC, 2017. Syria conflict: 'Chemical attack' in Idlib kills 58. 
61 OPCW, 2017f. OPCW Fact-Finding Mission confirms use of chemical weapons in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 
2017. OPCW Press release 30.06.2017. 
62 Schneider and Lütkefend, 2019. Nowhere to hide. The logic of chemical weapons use in Syria. Global Public 
Policy Institute. Berlin, Germany p. 3 
63 al Maghafi, 2018. How chemical weapons have helped bring Assad close to victory. BBC News Panorama. 
64 Schneider and Lütkefend, 2019 p. 3 
65 Article II (1), OPCW, 2005 
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evaporates rapidly and does not leave behind very distinct metabolites or degradation products 
in the victims or in the environment.  
 
 
1.3.2 International efforts to uphold accountability concerning emerging CWC treaty 
violations 
 
In order to uphold the international law and treaties, those who break them should face 
consequences. Although CWs are subject to a comparatively well-developed set of 
international instruments such as the CWC, the international community as a whole has 
proven to be very limited in its capability to react and respond to the emerging CWC treaty 
violations with concise action. The veto powers of permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council (UN SC), the main UN body responsible in upholding the international law, 
are actively employed to prevent the UN SC from adopting any decisions that conflict with the 
interests of the said permanent member states. This has been characteristic also to the attempts 
to initiate chemical weapons justice processes, most prominently during the Syria crisis. 
The OPCW launched already in 2014 a still ongoing OPCW Fact Finding Mission (FFM)66 to 
investigate the alleged CWC treaty violations in the SAR area. The OPCW FFM was then 
seen as a purely technical effort to find out if chemical weapons had been used and did not 
seek to identify the perpetrators responsible of the CW use cases. In 2017, the FFM issued 
three reports determining that chemicals had been used as weapons in SAR: in Um Housh on 
16th September 2016; in Khan Shaykhun on 4th April 2017 and in Ltamenah on 30th March 
201767. The OPCW FFM efforts in Syria have continued up until this day. 
To uphold accountability regarding CWC treaty violations, the UN SC adopted resolution  
2235 (2015) on 7th August 2015, condemning “any use of any toxic chemical, such as  
chlorine, as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic”, and expressing determination to identify  
and hold accountable those responsible for such acts68. The resolution established a specially 
developed attribution mechanism, a partnership between the UN and the OPCW. The OPCW-
UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) had a mandate to “…identify individuals, entities, 
groups or governments who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in 
the use of CWs in the SAR…”. OPCW-UN JIM reports in 2016 and 2017 demonstrated the 
                                            
66 OPCW, 2014a. OPCW to undertake fact-finding mission in Syria on alleged chlorine gas attacks. OPCW Press 
release 29.4.2014 
67 OPCW AR, 2018. Report of the OPCW on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction in 2017. 
68 UN, 2017. Fact sheet. The OPCW –UN Joint Investigative Mechanism 
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involvement of SAR government in several chemical attacks carried out in SAR69. The UN 
SC renewed the JIM’s mandate in resolution 2319 on 17 November 201670, for a further 
period of one year. However, the mandate of OPCW-UN JIM ended in late 2017, after Russia 
repeatedly vetoed the renewal of its mandate by the UN SC71.  
Although the international response to the recent CWC treaty violations has reflected these 
constraints of the international security mechanism and appeared somewhat stalled, some 
progress has been made towards ensuring accountability regarding CW use. In addition to 
UN-OPCW JIM, terminated in 2017, various other initiatives have been launched aiming at 
attribution, collecting evidence and criminal prosecution in case of CWC violations. The UN 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic was 
established already in August 2011 by the UN Human Rights Council with a mandate to 
investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law since March 2011 in the 
SAR72. In addition, The International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism on International 
Crimes Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic (IIIM) was established in December 2016 by 
the UN General Assembly. IIIM seeks to assist in the investigation and prosecution of persons 
responsible for the most serious crimes under international law, committed in the SAR since 
March 2011, by collecting and analysing information and evidence to assist criminal 
proceedings in national, regional or international courts or tribunals that have, or may in the 
future have, jurisdiction over these crimes73.  
The examples mentioned above concern the operations of international organisations - The 
OPCW and the UN. In addition, individual states have the possibility to take initiatives on the 
international plane. The International Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical 
Weapons was launched in January 2018 by France. The membership of this intergovernmental 
initiative currently comprises 40 states and the European Union. The purpose of the 
mechanism is to collect and preserve information to hold accountable those responsible for the 
proliferation or use of chemical weapons. In addition, the purpose of the mechanism is to 
facilitate the sharing of such information through all available mechanisms, as well as to 
designate individuals, entities, groups and governments involved in the proliferation or use of 
                                            
69 OPCW UN JIM, 2016. Third report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United 
Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, Part V. Assessments, findings and conclusions pp.12-19; OPCW UN 
JIM, 2017. Seventh report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint 
Investigative Mechanism, Part IV (B) 46. 
70 UN SC, 2016b. United Nations Security Council resolution 2319 (2016). 
71 UN, 2017b. Security Council fails for fourth time to renew mandate of Joint Mechanism investigating chemical 
weapons attacks in Syria. 
72 UN, 2019a. Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. 
73 UN, 2019b. The International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism on international crimes committed in the 
Syrian Arab Republic. 
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chemical weapons, and publicise the names of those placed under sanctions for these74. 
France, in its capacity as a chair of the initiative, has published a guiding document on 
international tools for fighting against impunity for the use of chemical weapons75.  
 
 
1.3.3 The turning point - 4th special session of the CSP, July 2018 
 
 
At the 5-yearly planned 4th special session (SS) of the CSP in July 2018, the UK, supported 
by 30 other CWC states parties76 supplied a draft decision to be discussed at the conference, 
titled “Addressing the threat from chemical weapons use”77. The draft decision operative 
paragraph 1 condemned: 
“…in the strongest possible terms the use of chemical weapons by anyone under any 
circumstances, emphasising that any use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by 
anyone, under any circumstances is unacceptable and contravenes international norms and 
standards.” 
 
In addition, the decision condemned the use of chemical weapons since 2012 in Iraq, 
Malaysia, the SAR, and the UK, and condemned the use of chemical weapons by the SAR 
government as reported by the OPCW-UN JIM. Furthermore, the draft decision stated, that 
the OPCW TS will put in place arrangements to identify the perpetrators of the use of 
chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. Also, the OPCW director general, if requested 
by a state party investigating a possible CW use on its territory, could provide technical 
expertise to identify those who were perpetrators, organisers, sponsors or otherwise involved 
in the use of chemicals as weapons. The draft decision paragraphs 10 through 12 were as 
follows: 
“The Conference of the States Parties… 
 
…10. Decides that the Secretariat shall put in place arrangements to identify the 
perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic by identifying 
and reporting on all information potentially relevant to the origin of those chemical 
weapons in those instances in which the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria determines 
or has determined that use or likely use occurred, and cases for which the OPCW-UN 
Joint Investigative Mechanism has not issued a report; and decides also that the 
                                            
74 Chemical weapons - no impunity, 2020 
75 Ibid. The report states that it is not a negotiated product of the initiative participants and its contents do not 
represent positions of the initiative’s participating states. 
76 Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, 
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Secretariat shall provide regular reports on its investigations to the Council and to the 
United Nations Secretary-General for their consideration; 
 
11. Notes that under paragraph 35 of Article VIII, the Council shall consider any issue or 
matter within its competence affecting the Convention and its implementation, including 
concerns regarding compliance, and cases of non-compliance, and, as appropriate, 
inform States Parties and bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference, and 
further notes that under paragraph 36 of Article VIII of the Convention that, in its 
consideration of doubts or concerns regarding compliance and cases of non-compliance, 
the Council shall, in cases of particular gravity and urgency, bring the issue or matter 
directly to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations 
Security Council; 
 
12. Decides that the Secretariat shall preserve and provide information to the 
investigation mechanism established by the United Nations General Assembly in 
resolution 71/248 (2016), as well as to any relevant investigatory entities established 
under the auspices of the United Nations;” 
 
The draft decision was unprecedented, suggesting that the OPCW, previously determined to 
battle the use of chemical weapons with very neutral technical expertise approach and 
unequivocal analysis to proof the presence or absence of CWAs only, should start looking for 
answers to who has used the chemical weapons instead of plainly, if they had been used. 
 
 
1.3.4 Opposing positions of the CWC States Parties related to OPCW attribution tasks 
 
The draft decision was met with very heated discussion between the states parties and the 
OPCW groups of nations attending the 4th SS CSP, representing very different views on the 
scope and mandate of the CWC treaty. During the conference, 68 statements were given under 
this agenda item by the CWC state parties and other authorised delegations, with 62 of those 
made a public part of the proceedings and available for public. The draft decision were 
countered by seven amendment proposals and alternative draft decisions78, all which were 
voted upon and rejected by the conference. Consensus was not reached. Ultimately, the draft 
decision was voted on and adopted with two thirds majority CSP vote as decision C-SS-
4/Dec.3, dated 27 June 2018, with 82 votes for and 24 votes against the adoption of the 
decision79. The vote results, together with the attendance data on the conference are listed in 
Table II. 
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Table II: List of CWC states parties’ attendance80 and vote81 concerning the draft decision 
“Addressing the threat from chemical weapons use” at the 4th SS CSP. The states parties 
present in the SS but not voting on the draft decision were counted as abstaining from the 
vote. 
 
 
The decision C-SS-4/Dec.382, adopted by two-thirds majority vote in 4th special session of the 
CSP was formulated on the rationale that the mandate of including attribution duties in the 
functions of OPCW is already included in the current text of the CWC treaty. The decision 
text recalled Articles VIII, IX and XII of the treaty as the basis of the decision. The contents of 
these CWC Articles are discussed in detail in this study.  
 
 
1.3.4.1 We owe it to the victims  
 
The rationales presented in favour and against the adoption of the decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 in 
the 4th special session of the CSP can be examined through the national statements of the 
states and authorised parties, presented at the meeting and included in the meeting’s official 
documentation. The viewpoints presented at the 4th SS CSP by the CWC states parties in 
favour of adopting the decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 highlight the responsibility of the international 
community to ensure accountability of those guilty of using CWs. Establishing a functional 
mechanism of attribution is presented as an integral requirement for this process.  
                                            
80 OPCW CSP SS4 INF 1, 2018. List of participants of the fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States 
Parties. 
81 OPCW CSP SS4, 2018 
82 OPCW CSP SS4 DEC 3, 2018. Decision: Addressing the threat from chemical weapons use 
CWC states 
parties/Area 
Number Present 
at the 
4th SS 
CSP 
Voted Abstained  For Against Voting 
% 
Abstain 
% 
Against 
% 
For % 
Total 193 152 106 46 82 24 69.7 30.3 22.6 77.4 
Africa 52 31 16 15 9 7 51.6 48.4 43.8 56.3 
Asia 56 45 29 16 17 12 64.4 35.6 41.4 58.6 
Eastern 
Europe 
23 22 20 2 18 2 90.9 9.1 10.0 90.0 
Latin 
America and 
the 
Caribbean 
33 25 13 12 10 3 52.0 48.0 23.1 76.9 
Western 
European 
and other 
states 
29 29 28 1 28 0 96.6 3.4 0.0 100.0 
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European Union was represented at the CSP by Bulgaria, whose representative Ms. Koromi 
gave official statements on behalf of the EU both before and after adopting the decision C-SS-
4/Dec.3. In the first statement83 before the decision vote, she recalled the recent years’ CWA 
use events in detail, pointing out that for the first time in over 70 years chemical weapons use 
has occurred on European soil, and urged the CWC states parties to accept the decision. 
Regarding the attribution tasks she continued: 
 
“…We firmly believe that it is the international community’s task and responsibility to 
identify and hold accountable individuals, entities, groups or governments responsible for 
the use of chemical weapons, and that the question of attribution can and should be 
addressed by the OPCW ... We were disappointed with the impasse at the United Nations 
Security Council at the end of last year, which effectively terminated the Joint 
Investigative Mechanism. This outcome deprived the international community of a vital 
mechanism in the significant efforts designed to uphold the absolute ban on the use of 
chemical weapons and deter other would-be perpetrators. Restoring an independent 
mechanism for attribution has become particularly important in this regard. The 
Convention allows the OPCW itself to go into attribution. The Organisation has the 
technical capacity and operational experience to, with the addition of appropriate 
expertise, carry out investigations for attribution purposes once it has the necessary 
information and evidence at its disposal. The OPCW Technical Secretariat has shown 
through its recent work, that once tasked and resourced to undertake challenging 
missions, it can more than deliver…” 
 
The EU statement reflects the other national statements speaking for the approval of the 
decision. Overall, the rationale of states parties speaking for accepting and including 
attribution duties for the OPCW were based on as those simply being already included in the 
text of the CWC treaty.  
The statements speaking in favour of adopting the decision can be characterised as in part 
highly emotionally loaded: 
 
“… The use of chemical weapons, including the use of any toxic chemical as weapon, by 
anyone, be it a State, or a non-State actor, anywhere, and under any circumstances is 
abhorrent and must be rigorously condemned. It is a war crime and may amount to a 
crime against humanity. There can be no impunity and those responsible for such acts 
must be held accountable. This is what keeps us together and keeps the global norm 
established by the Convention … All States Parties to this Convention owe it to the victims 
of the chemical weapons attacks and to the future generations to whom we have 
committed ourselves to free the world from the scourge of chemical weapons…”84 
                                            
83 OPCW CSP SS4 NAT 5, 2018. Bulgaria: Statement on Behalf of the EU Delivered by Ms. Judit Koromi, 
Chair of the Working Party on Non-Proliferation (CONOP) of the Council of the EU, European External Action 
Service, at the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the State Parties. 
84 Ibid. 
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1.3.4.2 This path is wrought with unpredictable implications 
 
These counterarguments for adopting the decision were also laden with highly emotional 
pleadings. In several national statements85, the adopted decision’s legitimacy was questioned. 
A particularly vocal opposite of the adoption of the decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 was Russian 
Federation, who released two statements concerning the matter, as well as an amended draft 
decision which was, however, rejected by vote. The head of the Russian delegation Mr. 
Kalamanov argued in his statement86 before the vote: 
“…It is also clear that no transformations of this kind are possible without making 
substantial amendments to the Convention. The implementation of these types of plans can 
only be carried out in line with the procedure set out in the Convention: by convening a 
special session of the Conference on amendments. Attempts to pass this decision at 
today’s regular special session of the Conference are simply illegitimate. In all of this, we 
see a clear attempt to distort the mandate of the OPCW, and to undermine the legal 
framework upon which it rests. This is a destructive idea with which we categorically 
disagree...”   
 
By the decision opponents, the common argument was that the CWC does not contain any 
provision that states the OPCW, or its policy-making organs having the mandate to establish a 
violation of an obligation under the CWC, and that the CWC is a purely technical 
arrangement87. In addition, the OPCW was characterised as a purely technical organisation. 
Investigation of activities prohibited under CWC, as well as criminal prosecution for such 
facts, were seen to be entrusted directly to the states parties by the CWC Article VII. Any 
attributive function was seen to go beyond the mandate of the OPCW as set out in the treaty, 
and creation of such attributive mechanism within the OPCW could be legitimate only 
through adoption of a relevant amendment to the CWC, as provided for in Article XV of the 
CWC. Furthermore, the CWC states parties opposing the CSP decision presented claims that 
the mechanism thus established encroaches on the tasks and duties of the UN88. 
                                            
85 See OPCW CSP SS4 NAT 17, 2018. Syrian Arab Republic: Statement by H.E. Ambassador Bassam Al-
Sabbagh, permanent representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the OPCW at the fourth Special Session of the 
Conference of the States Parties; OPCW CSP SS4 NAT 40, 2018 Russian Federation. Statement by Mr G. V. 
Kalamanov, head of delegation of the Russian Federation at the 4th SS of the CSP; OPCW CSP SS4 NAT 54, 
2018. Venezuela: Statement by H.E. Ambassador Haifa Aissami Madah, permanent representative of Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela to the OPCW at the fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties - 
Explanation of vote. 
86 OPCW CSP SS4 NAT 40 
87 See OPCW CSP SS4 NAT 17, 2018; OPCW CSP SS4 NAT 40, 2018; OPCW CSP SS4 NAT 54, 2018 
88 OPCW CSP SS4 NAT 53, 2018. Venezuela: Statement by H.E. Ambassador Haifa Aissami Madah, permanent 
representative of Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the OPCW at the fourth Special Session of the Conference 
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“…Will this not lead to a failure in the work of global non-proliferation regimes or even a 
breakdown of the entire international security system that has developed since World War 
II, and the central role of the United Nations and its Security Council in international 
affairs? This path is wrought with unpredictable implications, particularly in the era of 
the emergence of a new generation of nuclear weapons. People of good faith ought to 
come together in order to put up a barrier against these reckless plans…”89 
 
 
1.3.5 First steps in the implementation of the decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 
 
The OPCW DG has reported90 that pursuant to the decision the TS has established an 
Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) which will be responsible for identifying the 
perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the SAR on the conditions stated in the 
decision.  The IIT reports directly to the OPCW DG.  
At its 23rd session in 201891, the CSP adopted the programme and budget of the OPCW for 
2019, which included resource requirements for implementing the IIT functions but stated that 
1.3 million euros of the costs were not include in the regular budget and were to be covered 
with voluntary funding. A similar decision concerning 1.2 million euros was made by the CSP 
for the budget in 202092. In early 2020, the OPCW DG reported that the financial implications 
for the CWC states parties to support the IIT’s work during 2019 and 2020 are considered to 
have been met via voluntary contributions made by the CWC SPs93.  
The IIT has announced its intention to investigate nine chemical attacks in Syria. However, 
the Syrian Arab Republic has indicated to the OPCW DG its refusal to recognise the decision 
C-SS-4/Dec.3 and to accept any of the implications and effects of the decision. In early 2020, 
the IIT was reported being in the process of concluding a first report on certain incidents under 
its consideration.94  
                                                                                                                                        
of the States Parties; OPCW CSP SS4 NAT 19, 2018. Syrian Arab Republic: Statement by HE Ambassador 
Bassam Al-Sabbagh, permanent representative of the SAR to the OPCW at the 4th SS of the CSP. 
89 OPCW CSP SS4 NAT 40 
90 OPCW DG, 2019. Report by the director-general. Progress in the implementation of decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 on 
addressing the threat from chemical weapons use. 
91 OPCW CSP S23 DEC 10, 2018. Decision: Programme and Budget of the OPCW for 2019. 
92 OPCW CSP S24 DEC 12, 2019. Decision: Programme and Budget of the OPCW for 2020. 
93 OPCW EC, 2020. Report by the director-general. Progress in the implementation of decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 on 
addressing the threat from chemical weapons use. 
94 Ibid. 
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2 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
2.1 Aims of the study and research questions 
 
The current events within the CWC and OPCW discussed in Chapter 1 and its subchapters 
raise several interesting questions concerning the legal impact of the decision to establish 
OPCW tasks and mechanisms related to attribution of responsibility for CW use in SAR. 
These questions are highlighted, for example, in the very divided national statements of the 
CWC states parties given in in conjunction with adoption of the CSP decision C-SS-4/Dec.3. 
This study aims to evaluate the legality of this OPCW decision under the international law. 
The OPCW, as an international organisation, has made an internal decision to undertake the 
tasks and duties described in the decision C-SS-4/Dec.3. From this viewpoint the most 
important research questions are:  
  
 Is the fact-finding in the cases of alleged use of CWs with the objective to 
attribute liability to states within the scope and competence of the OPCW, as they are 
set out in the CWC treaty? 
 Are the tasks allocated to the different OPCW organs in the decision C-SS-
4/Dec.3 in compliance with the tasks of the respective organs, as set out in the treaty? 
 Was the CSP decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 made in compliance with the procedural 
and voting requirements of the OPCW? 
 Would the new OPCW duties laid out in the decision warrant a formal 
amendment process of the CWC treaty? 
 
Additionally, this study aims to examine the following additional question: 
 
 Are the OPCW attribution of responsibility duties, as laid out in the decision, in 
line with the division of OPCW tasks and the responsibilities, tasks and authority of 
the United Nations, those of the UN Security Council in particular? 
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2.2 Research method  
 
Defining the knowledge interest, “What do I want to know about my research topic?” is a key 
part of planning a master’s thesis research work95. Methodology in the academic thesis 
context means the entity created by the work’s philosophy of science, theoretical model, 
means of data collection and the research material analysis method (research method) used96.  
As the topic of this research is application and scope of an international treaty on chemical 
disarmament and therefore the subject is international law, the theoretical framework and the 
scientific paradigm followed in this work is European legal positivism, the mainstream 
approach in research of international public law. Its origins lay in the legal theory relating to 
national legal systems, in which legal positivism is a currently a paradigm of analytical 
jurisprudence that sees the existence and content of law depending on social facts and not on 
the law’s merits97. Laws in force in a legal system depend on the social standards that its 
officials recognise as authoritative. These can be for example, legislative enactments, judicial 
decisions, or social customs. Laws cannot be defined by which policies would be just, wise or 
efficient, and on the opposite hand, a law does not cease to exist just because it is unjust, 
unwise or inefficient. Legal positivism does not take into account matters of ethics, social 
policies or morality. The research subject in the context of legal positivism is the formally 
binding law only.98 In its narrowest sense, legal positivism is a theory, which tells us that law 
is only that which is positus, i.e. set/put into the world by human willing99. 
International law is the set of laws that govern relations between countries, as established by 
custom and agreement100. International law differs substantially from national legal systems as 
in the international legal framework there is no sovereign lawmaker. International law 
therefore lacks an equivalent legislature to domestic one, and it does not have courts with 
compulsory jurisdiction as to national courts101. From the legal positivism point of view, a 
formally binding international law is considered to be the set of rules that sovereign nations 
have agreed to follow based on treaties, facts that otherwise imply the state party’s implicit 
                                            
95 Siren & Pekkarinen, 2017. Tieteenfilosofismetodologisia perusteita Pro Gradu -tutkielman laadintaan. 
Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Johtamisen ja sotilaspedagogiikan laitos, Helsinki, Finland. In Finnish. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Green & Adams in Zalta (2019), entry on legal positivism. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Winter 
2019 Edition) 
98 Siren & Pekkarinen, 2017 
99 Kammerhofer in Delplano & Tsagourias (2020) Research Methods in International Law: A Handbook. Edward 
Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham, UK. Ch International legal positivist research methods p. 8 
100 AHDEL, 2016. International law. American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. 5th Edition. 
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consent, or formed by customary international law102. Treaties embody the express consent of 
states, custom their tacit consent103,104. Decisions of international courts and tribunals may be 
used as a tool to further determine and analyse the content, scope and applicability of norms 
based in custom, treaty and the general principles.105 
Research methodology based on legal positivism is the most common in international law 
research. It is also the approach, which is used in international courts and tribunals in their 
work. Simma and Paulus examine positivist approaches to international law, and international 
humanitarian law in particular, and note key changes they describe as modern positivism. 
Modern positivism takes a broader view of the ways in which states can express their will. 
Different branches of government are increasingly acting on their own behalf instead of 
through foreign ministries, in addition, other actors than states such as intergovernmental 
organisations, nongovernmental organisations, global economic players and the global media 
are assuming growing importance. The authors argue that as international norm perception 
focuses on the will of states less than previously, the sources of law, and the interpretive tools 
to understand them also have to change. For the modern representatives of analytical 
positivism, the unity of the legal system, embodied by the ‘unity of primary and secondary 
sources,’ is more important than the emanation of law from concrete acts of state will. Modern 
positivism increasingly recognises that law is not independent of its context.106 
Kammerhofer argues further that currently practised international positivist research methods 
and practices are largely determined by culture, rather than a closed set of theoretical axioms. 
He makes a distinction between theoretical legal positivism and the currently practised 
‘default positivism’, illustrating the difference by several examples. Current methods practised 
by international legal positivists are characterised by heightened submission to widely 
accepted authority of peers, such as the pronouncements of the International court of justice. 
Default positivist approaches also tend to be very pragmatic and do not highlight theoretical 
debate. Part of this realist-pragmatic approach is an orientation towards problem solving, 
which clashes with theoretical positivism where certain problems cannot be ‘solved’. This 
includes the principle that legal scholars should seek to find the law rather than to change it.107 
                                            
102 Siren & Pekkarinen, 2017 
103 Simma & Paulus (1999) The responsibility of individuals in human rights abuses in internal conflicts: A 
positivist view. American journal of International Law. pp. 302-316. 
104 These sources are the ‘positive international law’, on the sense that the norms they generate have been chosen 
or agreed upon by states in their dealings with each other. In the absence of such evidence of the will of states, 
positivists will assume that states remain at liberty to undertake whatever actions they please. Treaties, including 
so-called lawmaking treaties creating new rules or changing old ones, are binding upon the contracting parties 
only. 
105 Hall in McConville & Chui (2017) Ch 10, Researching international law p. 254 
106 Simma & Paulus, 1999 pp 302-316. 
107 Kammerhofer in Delplano & Tsagourias (2020) Ch International legal positivist research methods p. 5 
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The international legal positivist approach to international legal rules resembles the doctrinal 
method within the legal theory in national civil law systems. Therein what can be called 
scientific knowledge is created only through following a scientific method, using a defined 
process for searching, generating and explaining information. There is no generally applicable 
and standardised set of research methods for the scientific study of law. As jurisprudence falls 
between social sciences and human sciences, the range of applicable research methods is 
rather diverse and encompasses an open-ended variety of qualitative as well as quantitative 
tools. Doctrinal method, followed in this study, is a distinctly legal approach to research. The 
doctrinal method forms the basis of most legal research, although the use of non-doctrinal, 
multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary methods is growing. Traditionally, the method is 
divided into theoretical and practical dimensions, or systemisation and interpretation.108  
Moreover, within the legal theory relating to common law -legal systems doctrinal process is 
used to identify, analyse and synthesise the content of the law, and to verify the authority and 
status of the legal doctrine examined. In legal doctrine research, the legal system is used as the 
main supplier of concepts, categories and criteria. Doctrinal research is normally a two-part 
process involving locating the sources of the law and relevant legal materials, and then 
interpreting the text.109 In doctrinal research, the researcher asks what the law is in a particular 
area - the principal or even sole aim is to describe a body of law, and how it applies. Doctrinal 
research is often done from a historical perspective, by collecting and analysing a body of case 
law, together with any relevant legislation. These are usually called the primary sources of 
law. Secondary sources, such as journal articles or other written commentaries on the case law 
and legislation may be also be employed. Secondary sources may be used in supporting a 
particular interpretation, but can not replace primary sources.110 
In general, the same approach is utilised in international legal positivism, when a certain legal 
problem has to be analysed. First, the researcher has to find out the applicable legal rules to 
the problem, i.e. to systemise the applicable legal rules, and thereafter their content has to be 
interpreted to the sub questions of the legal problem presented. However, as stated before, the 
applicable legal rules are and their sources in international law are different from national or 
municipal legal systems. In international law they are the treaty rules, rules of international 
customary law, or general principles of law.  
                                            
108 Hirvonen, 2011. Mitkä metodit? Opas oikeustieteen metodologiaan. Yleisen oikeustieteen julkaisuja 17. 
Helsingin yliopisto, Helsinki, Finland. In Finnish. p. 22 
109 Hutchinson in Watkins & Burton (Eds., 2017) Research methods for law. Second edition. Routledge, New 
York, USA. Ch 1, Doctrinal research p. 17 
110 Dobinson & Johns in McConville & Chui (2017) Ch 1, Legal research as qualitative research p. 21 
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The established paradigm in legal research has been that there is an objective approach to 
finding the law, and that doctrinal research is therefore quantitative by nature. Doctrinal 
research is based on positivism and the worldview where the law is objective, neutral and 
fixed111. In order to be deemed quantitative, it must be assumed that the doctrinal research 
method always leads to discovering the same law using the systematic doctrinal approach, 
regardless of who is carrying out the research. Doctrinal research, however, does include a 
process of judicial inductive reasoning, where the principle is extracted from a detailed 
analysis of all relevant precedent. Doctrinal research also includes processes of selecting and 
weighing materials, taking into account hierarchy and authority, as well as understanding 
social context and interpretation. From this viewpoint, it can be argued that doctrinal research 
is qualitative in its methodology.112 To state, that doctrinal research is qualitative in nature 
therefore recognises that law is not found, but in fact reasoned, and acknowledges that the law 
cannot be objectively isolated113. 
The steps in judicial doctrinal research, inherent in all legal thinking, has been described, e.g. 
by Hutchinson and Duncan who discuss the varying degrees of complexity that exist within 
doctrinal legal research, ranging from practical problem-solving, most often employed by 
practitioners and students to solve a specific legal problem, all the way to innovative theory 
building and systematisation. Steps most commonly included in problem-based doctrinal 
research are illustrated in Figure 2. It should be emphasised, however, that the doctrinal 
methodology is not always focused on any specific legal problem, or directed to locating a 
concrete answer or conclusion. 
                                            
111 Hutchinson & Duncan, 2012. Defining and describing what we do: Doctrinal legal research. Deakin Law 
Review 17(1):83-119 p.116 
112 Dobinson & Johns in McConville & Chui (2017) Ch 1, Legal research as qualitative research pp. 23-24 
113 Ibid. p. 25 
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Figure 2. Steps of problem-based doctrinal research114. 
 
Doctrinal method is a two-part process, involving first locating the sources of the law and then 
interpreting and analysing their content within a specific context. In the interpretation step, the 
outcome of the study becomes dependent on the views, expertise and methods of the 
individual researcher. Techniques used within the interpretation process need to be described, 
whether they are conceptual, evaluative or explanatory. Examples that can be employed 
include deductive logic, inductive reasoning and analogy. Legal reasoning is often deductive 
because the general rules, categories and concepts are readily given, for example through 
legislation. In deductive legal reasoning, legal principles are applied to the facts of a particular 
case. The researcher studies the legislative provision, then studies the situation, and then 
decides if the situation comes within the rule. Inductive reasoning, on the other hand, is a 
process that argues from specific cases towards a more general rule, such as from particular 
case decisions to form a general proposition. Analogy involves finding similar situations such 
as similar common law cases, and then arguing that similar cases should have similar 
outcomes and be governed by same principles.115 
Within international law the deductive logic, inductive reasoning and analogy are among the 
lawyer’s tools. Therefore the research method of this study, dealing with the international 
legal basis and implications of a decision made within an international organisation 
implementing a treaty, can be best characterised as problem-based doctrinal research 
described above. The methodology is based on the scientific paradigm of international legal 
                                            
114 as listed in Hutchinson & Duncan, 2012 p. 106 
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positivism in its current, modern and “enlightened” form. In this study, deductive legal 
reasoning is employed as an analysis method to examine the legal issues presented as research 
questions in Chapter 2.1, together with the located sources of the law and relevant legal 
materials presented in Chapter 2.3, Materials.  
 
 
2.2.1 Sources of law in international law  
 
Within the common law, the doctrinal legal research is based on authority and hierarchy. The 
objective is to base any statements about what the law is on primary authority - either the 
legislation or the case law.116 In international legal science, the term “sources” is used to 
designate sources of positive legal rules, i.e. the legal rules in force and their origins. 
Accordingly, the sources of international law refer to where states, organisations, individuals 
and courts can find the principles of international law117. One broadly accepted definition of 
sources of international law is presented in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
Article 38118, which defines in paragraph 1 that: 
 
“The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.” 
 
In these, the actual legal sources are presented in Article 38 (1) (a-c) whereas those presented 
in (d) are in fact tools for their interpretation. The most important item of these tools are the 
judicial decisions, because they by nature always consider which legal sources of the (a-c) are 
to be applied to the legal problem in hand. Apart from international conventions and 
international custom, the ICJ Statute Article 38 (c) refers to the general principles of law 
recognised by civilised nations. These can be defined alternatively as principles that can 
                                                                                                                                        
115 Hutchinson & Duncan, 2012 p.111 
116 Dobinson & Johns in McConville & Chui (2017) Ch 1, Legal research as qualitative research p. 26. In 
doctrinal research, the first step, identification of relevant legislation, cases and secondary legal sources can be 
considered analogous to a scientific literature review of social sciences. This should be a systematic, explicit and 
reproducible step for identifying, evaluating and synthesising the existing body of completed and recorded work 
of researchers, scholars and practitioners. 
117 Cornell law school, legal information institute, 2020. Entry on sources of international law. 
118 Article 38 (1), ICJ, 2020 
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derived from various systems of domestic law, where the principles are shared by all or 
majority of them - or principles applicable directly to international legal relations, or general 
legal relations119. 
It can be argued, that the doctrine of sources in international law is in practise more nuanced, 
and the above definition misses some relevant sources concerning international law 
obligations, such as certain unilateral declarations of the states, resolutions of the UN SC, 
resolutions of the UN GA, and to some extent, peremptory jus cogens norms120. Hierarchy of 
sources in international law is, in general less defined than in national legislation, and, for 
example, the above-mentioned Article 38 of the ICJ statute does not state the order of which 
the sources of law are to be applied, apart from the reference to “subsidiary means” in Article 
38 (1) (d).121 
In the international context, examples of soft law include the decisions of international 
tribunals and the standards endorsed by international organisations. Soft law can also be 
defined as something that looks like a legal obligation in a way (e.g. a written exchange of 
promises between states) but is not enough to formally bind states122. Classic legal positivism 
places emphasis on hard law only - in essence there is no place for soft law in classical 
positivist approach123. However, in addition to hard international law, soft law is an integral 
part of the international legal system. Guzman and Meyer124 define soft law as those 
nonbinding rules or instruments that interpret or inform our understanding of binding legal 
rules, and as rules that have legal consequences because they shape states’ expectations as to 
what constitutes compliant behaviour. By this definition, the authors aim to preserve the 
doctrinal distinction between binding and nonbinding norms, but also highlight the difference 
between quasi-legal rules and purely political rules.  
 
                                            
119 Roberts and Sivakumaran in Evans (2018) Ch 4, The theory and reality of the sources in international law p. 
98.  
120 Ibid. pp. 100-102. General principles of law can be source of peremptory norms of general international law 
or jus cogens. This is defined in the VCLT Article 53: “… a peremptory norm of general international law is a 
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having 
the same character.“ VCLT, 1969.  The same Article states that a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it 
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. 
121 Dixon (2013) Textbook on international law. 7th Edition. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Ch 2, The 
Sources of international law p. 25 
122 Guzman & Meyer, 2010. International soft law. Journal of legal analysis 2(1):171-225 p. 172 
123 Simma & Paulus, 1999 p. 304 
124 Guzman & Meyer, 2010 p. 174 
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2.2.2 Treaty interpretation - a tool for resolving ambiguities of treaty texts 
 
The purpose of treaty interpretation is to establish the meaning the parties intended it to have 
in relation to the circumstances with reference to which the question of interpretation has 
arisen125. An international legal positivist view is that through interpretation we can generate 
specificity out of unspecific (treaty) norms and guide decision-making126. The principles of 
treaty interpretation is set out in the VCLT Articles 31 and 32. Fitzmaurice has devised a 
comprehensive set on general principles of treaty interpretation, based on these articles, 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. General principles of treaty interpretation127. 
 
The purpose, structure and competences of an international organisation, as well the particular 
functions and powers granted to its individual organs, are set out in the treaty that establishes 
the organisation. The treaties as written agreements, however, need to be interpreted. As 
treaties, in many cases, create rights and impose obligations to the members, as well as may 
define the relationship between organisations and third parties, the manner of which the 
treaties are interpreted is of importance.128 
Interpretations of treaties establishing international organisations is also governed by the 
VCLT Articles 31 and 32. The fact that the VCLT applies to such treaties is explicitly stated 
in VCLT Article 5129. The 1986 Vienna convention between states and international 
organisations or between international organisations adapts the 1969 VCLT to its subject 
                                            
125 Fitzmaurice in Evans (2018) Ch 6, The practical working of the law of treaties p. 152 
126 Kammerhofer in Delplano & Tsagourias (2020) Ch International legal positivist research methods p. 6 
127 as listed by Fitzmaurice in Evans (2018) Ch 6, The practical working of the law of treaties pp. 152-153 
128 Akande in Evans (2018) Ch 8, International organizations p. 235 
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matter. The treaty is not yet in force, however, is considered to reflect customary international 
law130. The ICJ has stated that treaty interpretation should be based above all upon the text of 
the treaty131. However, interpretation of treaties establishing international organisations must 
give special emphasis to the objectives and purposes to the instrument and the organisation. 
Article 31 of the VCLT states that a treaty must be interpreted in the light of the treaty’s object 
and purpose132. In addition, the ICJ has noted in its advisory opinion on the Legality of use by 
a state of nuclear weapons from 1996, that the constituent instruments of international 
organisations are treaties of a peculiar character and raise specific problems of interpretation. 
These may be due to, for example, the nature of the organisation, the objects that have been 
assigned to it, as well as the imperatives associated with the effective performance of its 
functions133.  
The increased role of objects and purposes in treaty interpretation in cases of treaties 
establishing international organisations is known as the principle of effectiveness. In essence, 
the treaty text is interpreted in a way that that gives the most effective result concerning the 
achievement of the purpose and objectives of the organisation. A primary example of this 
principle is the doctrine of implied powers, by which an organisation is deemed to have 
powers necessary for achieving its purposes even in the absence of words in the text, which 
would indicate that the organisation is to have such a power.134 
The role of subsequent practise is also of importance and used not only where there are 
ambiguities in the treaty text, but also in cases of silence, and to construct new rules that apply 
to the treaty. Treaties establishing international organisations are seen as living, changing 
instruments and they must be permitted to evolve in order to the organisation to fulfil its 
purpose in the changing environment135. Article 31 of the VCLT136 stipulates that any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty, which establishes the agreement of the 
                                                                                                                                        
129 Article 5: “The present Convention applies to any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international 
organization and to any treaty adopted within an international organization without prejudice to any relevant rules 
of the organization.” VCLT, 1969 
130 VCLTIO, 1986; also Fitzmaurice in Evans (2018) Ch 6, The practical working of the law of treaties p. 143 
131 paragraph 41 on page 19, Judgment, Case concerning the territorial dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), 
ICJ, 1994. 
132 Article 31 (1): ”A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. VCLT, 1969 
133 paragraph 19 on page 75: “…the constituent instruments of international organizations are also treaties of a 
particular type; their object is to create new subjects of law endowed with a certain autonomy, to which the 
parties entrust the task of realizing common goals. Such treaties can raise specific problems of interpretation 
owing, inter alia, to their character which is conventional and at the same time institutional; the very nature of the 
organization created, the objectives which have been assigned to it by its founders, the imperatives associated 
with the effective performance of its functions, as well as its own practice, are all elements which may deserve 
special attention when the time comes to interpret these constituent treaties.” ICJ, 1996  
134 Akande in Evans (2018) Ch 8, International organizations p. 157 
135 Ibid. p. 155 
136 Article 31 (3) (b), VCLT, 1969 
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parties regarding its interpretation, is to be taken into account. As an example of international 
case law concerning subsequent practise of international organisations, the ICJ ruled in its 
Advisory opinion on Namibia137 that based on the consistent practise of the UN SC, a 
permanent member of the UN SC abstaining from voting is not to be construed as a veto, but a 
concurring vote. 
 
 
2.3 Materials 
 
This chapter describes the sources of international law used in this study. The primary sources 
include the CWC treaty text and its annexes, the UN Charter, as well as the text of the VCLT, 
which applies to treaties concluded between states, and to treaties between states and 
international organisations138 such as the OPCW.  
The resolutions adopted by the UN SC and the UN GA concerning the CW use in the SAR 
between years 2013-2020 were located. This was done in a systematic fashion via the UN SC 
resolutions search engine139 and the UN GA resolutions index140 by searching the resolutions 
by year using keywords “chemical”, “chemical weapons” and “OPCW”. Only resolutions 
addressing the Middle East were collected. 
Existing sources on the subject such as the legal commentary of the CWC141, relationship 
agreements between the OPCW and the UN, decisions of the OPCW bodies, and the relevant 
ICJ decisions were used to facilitate the deductive reasoning and making the conclusions. The 
documents deemed relevant were retrieved by the discussion themes, during the process of the 
work. Also listed are relevant resolutions of the UN organs, where located but not within the 
systematic collection of resolutions described above. 
Textbooks and articles on international law, relevant reports and other documents from the 
meetings of the different OPCW bodies as well as national statements delivered in those were 
collected and reviewed for the purpose of understanding the OPCW practise as well as 
building the timeline and sequence of the events. The OPCW reports and national statements 
used for this study have been retrieved from the OPCW public website that holds the records 
                                            
137 paragraph 22 on page 22. Legal consequences for states of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) nothwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970). ICJ, 1971 
138 Article 5, VCLT, 1969 
139 Search engine UNSCR, 2020 
140 UN GA resolutions index, 2020 
141 Krutzsch W, Myjer E & Trapp R (Eds., 2014) The chemical weapons convention: A commentary. 1st edition, 
Oxford university press, UK 
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of the documents from the sessions of the OPCW organs.142 These were not collected and 
reviewed in a systematic fashion but rather based on assumed relevance, and are not listed in 
the materials, but referenced in footnotes as usual, with details provided in the list of sources. 
 
 
2.3.1 The Chemical Weapons Convention text and its annexes 
 
The CWC treaty text used for this study is the English version of the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and 
on Their Destruction, dated 27th September 2005 (Table III). The treaty text is publicly 
available at the OPCW website, and also included in the OPCW legal texts collection143 used 
as a source for this study. 
 
Table III: Details of the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
 
UN Treaty 
Collection 
Registration number 
Multilateral Treaties Deposited 
at Secretary General Collection 
Reference  
Title Entry into 
force 
Reference in 
this study 
No. 33757, 29. April 
1997 
XXVI-3 The Convention on the 
Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and 
on Their Destruction 
29. April 1997 OPCW, 2005 
 
 
2.3.2 The Vienna convention on the law of treaties 
 
The VCLT treaty text from 1969 used for this study is the English version of treaty, dated 23rd 
May 1969 (Table IV). The treaty text was retrieved from the UN Treaty Collection website144. 
 
Table IV: Details of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
 
UN Treaty 
Collection 
Registration number 
Multilateral Treaties 
Deposited at Secretary 
General Collection 
Reference  
Title Entry into 
force 
Reference in 
this study 
No. 18232, 27 
January 1980 
XXIII-1 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties 
27 January 
1980 
VCLT, 1969 
 
                                            
142 OPCW, 2020. Resources. 
143 OPCW, 2015. OPCW: the legal texts. 3rd edition. Asser Press, the Netherlands. 
144 VCLT, 1969 
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2.3.3 The United Nations Charter 
 
The UN Charter from 1945 is the English version of treaty (Table V). The current version of 
the treaty text was retrieved from the United Nations website145. 
 
Table V: Details of the United Nations Charter  
 
UN Treaty 
Collection 
Registration number 
Multilateral Treaties 
Deposited at Secretary 
General Collection 
Reference   
Title Entry into 
force 
Reference in 
this study 
- I-1 Charter of the United Nations 
and Statute of the International 
Court of Justice 
24 October 
1945 
The UN Charter 
 
 
 
2.3.3.1 United Nations Security Council and United Nations General Assembly 
resolutions 
 
The resolutions adopted by the UN SC and the UN GA concerning the CW use in the SAR 
between years 2013-2020 were located in a systematic fashion via the UN SC resolutions 
search engine and the UN GA resolutions collection by searching the resolutions by year with 
keywords “chemical”, “chemical weapons” and “OPCW”. Only resolutions addressing the 
SAR were collected. List of the UN SC and the UN GA resolutions addressing the CW use in 
the SAR between years 2013 - 2020 is presented in Table VI. 
 
Table VI: List of the UN SC and the UN GA resolutions addressing the CW use in the SAR 
between years 2013 - 2020.  
 
UN document number Title Adopted, date Adopted by Reference in this 
study 
A/RES/70/41 Implementation of the 
Convention on the 
Prohibition of the 
Development, 
Production, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their 
Destruction 
7th December 2015 UN GA UN GA, 2015 
A/RES/72/43 Implementation of the 
Convention on the 
prohibition of the 
development, 
production, stockpiling 
and use of chemical 
4th December 2017 UN GA UN GA, 2017 
                                            
145 UN, 2020b. The United Nations Charter. 
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weapons and on their 
destruction 
A/RES/73/45 Implementation of the 
Convention on the 
prohibition of the 
development, 
production, stockpiling 
and use of chemical 
weapons and on their 
destruction 
5th December 2018 UN GA UN GA, 2018 
A/RES/74/40 Implementation of the 
Convention on the 
prohibition of the 
development, 
production, stockpiling 
and use of chemical 
weapons and on their 
destruction 
19th December 2019 UN GA UN GA, 2019 
S/RES/2118 (2013) Resolution 2118 (2013) 27th September 2013 UN SC UN SC, 2013 
S/RES/2209 (2015) Resolution 2209 (2015) 6th March 2015 UN SC UN SC, 2015 
S/RES/2235 (2015) Resolution 2235 (2015) 7th August 2015 UN SC UN SC, 2015b 
S/RES/2258 (2015) Resolution 2258 (2015) 22nd December 2015 UN SC UN SC, 2015c 
S/RES/2314 (2016) Resolution 2314 (2016) 31st October 2016 UN SC UN SC, 2016 
S/RES/2319 (2016) Resolution 2319 (2016) 17th  November 2016 UN SC UN SC, 2016b 
S/RES/2325 (2016) Resolution 2325 (2016) 15th December 2016 UN SC UN SC, 2016c 
 
 
 
2.3.4 Other legal sources 
 
Source documents such as the legal commentary of the CWC, the relevant OPCW decisions, 
various ICJ opinions and rulings, agreements between IOs, and the resolutions of the UN 
organs, where not included in the resolutions addressing the SAR situation between years 
2013-2020 as described above, are listed in Table VII. 
 
Table VII: List of the various legal commentaries, legal text collections, ICJ opinions and 
rulings, decisions of the OPCW bodies, UN GA resolutions, and ILC reports used as sources 
of this study.  
 
Official citation/ 
document number 
Title Issued, date Issued by Reference in this 
study 
Legality of the Use by a 
State of Nuclear 
Weapons 
in Armed Conflict, 
Advisory Opinion, 
I. C. J. Reports 1996, p. 
66 
Advisory opinion of the 
International Court of 
Justice: Legality of the 
use by a state of nuclear 
weapons in armed 
conflict  
8 July 1996 ICJ ICJ, 1996 
Territorial Dispute 
(Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya/Chad), 
Judgment, 1. C. J. 
Reports 1994, p. 6 
Case concerning the 
territorial dispute 
(Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya/Chad)  
3 February 1994 ICJ ICJ, 1994 
Legal consequences for 
states of the continued 
presence of South 
Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) 
Legal consequences for 
states of the continued 
presence of South 
Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) 
21 June 1971 ICJ ICJ, 1971 
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nothwithstanding 
Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970) 
nothwithstanding 
Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970) 
Certain expenses of the 
United Nations (Article 
17, paragraph 2, 
of the Charter), 
Advisory Opinion of 20 
July 1962: 
I.C. J. Reports 1962, p. 
151. 
Certain expenses of the 
United Nations (Article 
17, paragraph 2, of the 
Charter) 
20 July 1962 ICJ ICJ, 1962 
Effect of awards of 
compensation made by 
the U. N. 
Administrative 
Tribunal, Advisory 
Opinion of July 13th, 
I954: 
I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 
47. 
ICJ Advisory opinion 
on Effect of awards of 
compensation made by 
the United Nations 
Administrative tribunal 
13 July, I954 ICJ ICJ, 1954 
Reparation for injuries 
suffered in the service 
of the United 
Nations, Advisory 
Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 
1949, p. 182 
Reparation for injuries 
suffered in the service 
of the United 
Nations, Advisory 
Opinion 
11 April, I954 ICJ ICJ, 1949 
ILC Report, A/56/10 Responsibility of States 
for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts 
August 2001 ILC ASRIWA, 2005 
EC-MXI/DEC.1 Agreement concerning 
the relationship 
between the United 
Nations and the OPCW 
1 September, 2000 OPCW OPCW EC, 2000 
EC-M-33/DEC.1 Decision. Destruction 
of Syrian chemical 
weapons. 
27 September 2013 OPCW OPCW EC, 2013 
- OPCW: The legal texts. 
3rd edition 
2015 OPCW OPCW, 2015 
EC-81/DEC.4 Decision. Report by the 
Director-General 
regarding the 
declaration and related 
submissions by the 
Syrian Arab Republic. 
23 March 2016 OPCW OPCW EC, 2016 
C-SS-4/DEC.3 Decision. Addressing 
the threat from 
chemical weapons use 
 
27 June 2018 OPCW OPCW CSP SS4 
DEC 3, 2018 
C-S-23/DEC10 Decision: Programme 
and Budget of the 
OPCW for 2019 
20 November 2018 OPCW OPCW CSP S23 
DEC 10, 2018 
C‑24/DEC.12 Decision: Programme 
and Budget of the 
OPCW for 2020 
28 December 2019 OPCW  OPCW CSP S24 
DEC 12, 2019 
Krutzsch W, Myjer E & 
Trapp R (Eds., 2014) 
The chemical weapons 
convention: A 
commentary. 1st 
edition, Oxford 
university press, UK. 
The chemical weapons 
convention: A 
commentary 
2014 Oxford university 
press, UK 
Krutzsch et al., 
2014 
A/RES/42/37 Measures to uphold the 
1925 Geneva protocol 
and to support the 
conclusion of a 
chemical weapons 
convention 
30 November 1987 UN GA UN GA, 1987 
A/RES/55/283 Cooperation between 
the United Nations and 
the Organization for the 
24 September 2001 UN GA UN GA, 2001 
        
 
45
Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons 
 
 
 
3 DISCUSSION 
 
 
3.1 The United Nations and its relationship with the OPCW 
 
The United Nations comprises 193 member states146. The UN can be considered the most 
important of all the present international organisations. The aims of the UN, established after 
the World War II in 1945, focus on the maintenance of international security, the development 
of friendly relations among the nations, international cooperation in solving international 
problems of an economic, humanitarian, cultural or social character, as well as the promotion 
of human rights147. The UN is composed of a number of organs, the two types of which 
(principal organs and subsidiary organs) are identified in the UN Charter Article 7 (1-2)148.  
The powers, functions and composition of the UN principal organs are determined by the UN 
Charter, whereas those of the subsidiary organs are determined by the principal organ that 
establishes them. Most prominent principal organs of the UN are the General Assembly, the 
Security Council and the International Court of Justice. Examples of the UN subsidiary organs 
include the UN Human Rights Council, established by the UN GA, and the UN peacekeeping 
missions established by the UN SC. The OPCW-UN JIM was a UN SC subsidiary organ149. In 
most cases, a principal organ will confer some of its powers on a subsidiary organ that it 
creates. The principal organs may be entitled to confer the subsidiary organ powers that it does 
not possess itself, in the case that the power to establish such a subsidiary organ is needed for 
the performance of the functions of the principal organ. Both the UN GA and the UN SC have 
established subsidiary organs having judicial powers, although they do not themselves possess 
such powers. The legality of this, as well as the fact that the subsidiary organ can be conferred 
powers to bind the principal organ, has been discussed in the ICJ Advisory opinion on Effect 
of awards of compensation made by the United Nations Administrative tribunal.150  
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In addition to the primary and subsidiary organs of the UN, the whole UN system comprises a 
family of IOs sharing common institutions and practises. Specialised agencies, such as the 
World Health Organisation, are autonomous organisations working with the UN, brought into 
relationship with the UN through negotiated agreements. The OPCW was created as an 
autonomous body under the UN system, but the OPCW is not an UN specialised agency. The 
OPCW retains autonomy regarding its programme and budget, and reports regularly on its 
activities to the First Committee of the UN GA151.  
The Article VIII paragraph 34 (a) of the CWC mandates the OPCW EC to conclude 
agreements or arrangements with states and international organisations on behalf of the 
OPCW. These agreements, however, are subject to approval by the CSP. The first such an 
agreement, an agreement concerning the relationship between the UN and the OPCW, was 
adopted by the OPCW EC in its 11th session on 1st September 2000, and approved by the 
CSP at its 6th session on 17th May 2001. The relationship agreement was approved by the UN 
GA in resolution A/RES/55/283, dated 24 September 2001. In the agreement, both 
organisations recognise each other’s responsibilities, objectives and mandates as well as 
establish a working relationship.152 The relationship agreement, Article I (1) states that: 
“The United Nations recognises the OPCW as the organisation, in relationship to the 
United Nations as specified in this agreement, responsible for activities to achieve the 
comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons in accordance with the Convention.” 
 
While the UN General Assembly is the UN plenary organ composed of all member states of 
the UN and has competence to discuss and make recommendations on a broad range of 
matters within the scope of the UN Charter, the UN GA can only make binding decisions on 
internal administrative matters.153 The UN Security Council, however, has the power to adopt 
decisions that bind the member states of the UN154. The powers and functions of the UN SC 
are established in the UN Charter Chapter V, Articles 24 through 26. Under Article 24, the 
members of the UN confer primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security on the SC, and agree that in carrying out its duties the SC acts on their behalf. 
The SC consists of fifteen members; five permanent (China, Russia, USA, UK and France) as 
well as ten other members elected for the term of two years by the UN GA155. The SC takes 
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decisions on the matters of substance by an affirmative vote of nine members, including the 
concurring votes of all permanent members156. 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter sets out the framework of the enforcement powers of the UN 
SC. As set out in Article 39, the UN SC is to determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. The UN SC will then make recommendations 
or decide what measures will be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. 
Article 41 deals with measures not involving the use of armed force, including e.g. 
interruption of economic relations or means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations. According to Article 42, if the measures provided for in Article 41 would 
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, the UN SC may take such action by air, sea, or 
land forces “as may be necessary” to maintain or restore international peace and security.157 
Any decision of the UN SC is legally binding to the UN member states under Article 25. 
However, whether a particular provision of a certain UN SC resolution is legally binding on 
member states (meaning whether the provision is a “decision” of the SC), including the 
addressee of the resolution, depends on whether the SC has chosen to use words within the 
provision indicating its intent to create a legally binding obligation. On the other hand, also 
the non-binding decisions of the SC can be considered to add to the juridical character of 
legally binding obligations for the addressee.158 When the position of the UN charter 
compared with other international agreements is considered, Article 103 of the UN Charter 
provides for the events of conflict between the obligations of the UN members under the UN 
Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement159. The Article states 
that in these cases the obligations under the UN Charter shall prevail.  
The UN mechanism to investigate alleged chemical, biological and toxin weapons use 
predates the CWC. The mechanism was developed during the 1980s to ascertain in an 
objective and scientific manner facts of alleged violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The 
UNSG mechanism, requested by the UN GA to be implemented by the UN SG in UN GA 
resolution A/RES/42/37160, allows the UN SG to carry out investigations in response to 
allegations involving the possible use of chemical, biological or toxin weapons. The possible 
use may be reported, and brought to the attention of the UN SG, by any member state of the 
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UN. The UNSG mechanism may dispatch fact-finding expert teams to collect and examine 
evidence. Member states of the UN maintain a list of qualified experts and laboratories 
available to such investigations.  
In April 2013 the UN SG, after receiving a formal request for the SAR, initiated an 
investigation under this mechanism into alleged use of CWs in the SAR161, then not a state 
party to the CWC. The OPCW participated in the investigations162. In cases of CW use by a 
state that is not party to the CWC, paragraph 27 of the Verification Annex Part XI stipulates 
that the OPCW is to cooperate closely with the UN SG and, if requested, put its resources at 
the disposal of the UN SG. In such cases, the OPCW essentially supports the UN SG 
mechanism by making available its inspectors and inspection equipment as well as its network 
of designated laboratories. The SAR deposited with the UN SG its instrument of accession to 
the CWC on 14th September 2013 and the CWC entered into force for the SAR in 14th 
October 2013163. After Syria acceded to the CWC, the initially declared Syrian CWAs were 
removed from Syria and subsequently destroyed by UN-OPCW joint mission, established on 
the basis of the OPCW -UN cooperation agreement and UN SC resolution 2118164.  
The UN organs have made numerous resolutions on the course of the ongoing armed conflict 
in the SAR. Concerning chemical weapons use in Syria and Syrian CW disarmament, one of 
the most prominent has been the above-mentioned UN SC resolution 2118 in September 2013 
after the SAR had announced its plans to accede to the CWC. The resolution invoked the 
Article 25 of the UN Charter, determined that the use of chemical weapons in the SAR 
constituted a threat to international peace and security, and bound the SAR to the elimination 
plan for the Syrian CW programme as outlined by the OPCW165. In addition, the resolution in 
its operative paragraph 4 stated that the UN SC: 
“Decides, that the Syrian Arab Republic shall not use, develop, produce, otherwise 
acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical 
weapons to other States or non-State actors.” 
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 In March 2015, the UN SC decided in its resolution 2209 that any future non-compliance 
with resolution 2118 would lead it to impose measures towards the SAR under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter166. The UN SC resolution 2235167 on 7th August 2015 expressed the 
determination of the SC to identify and hold accountable those responsible for CW use in 
Syria. Furthermore, the resolution 2235 established the OPCW-UN JIM by the UN SC 
decision, and reaffirmed the SC decision to impose measures under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter in response to violations of resolution 2118. The OPCW-UN JIM mandate was 
renewed by the UN SC in resolution 2319 for a further period of one year168.  
Apart from the SAR being a state party to the Geneva Protocol from 1925 and the CWC, these 
SC resolutions bind the SAR government under the international treaty law. Concerning the 
OPCW, the UN SC has in repeated resolutions made decisions with the aim of ensuring the 
full compliance of the SAR towards the CWC, as well as its full cooperation with the OPCW, 
including unhindered access of the OPCW to inspect the alleged use cases. These SC 
resolutions have not been upheld and enforced, however, and since the end of 2016, the UN 
SC has not reached resolutions addressing the ongoing CW use in the SAR. In February 2017, 
the UN SC failed to adopt a draft resolution that would have imposed Chapter VII sanctions 
on entities and individuals deemed to be involved in the production or use of CWs in the 
SAR, following vetoes by Russia and China169. In addition, the mandate of OPCW-UN JIM 
ended in late 2017, after Russia repeatedly vetoed the renewal of the mandate170. 
As discussed earlier, the OPCW-UN relationship is based on a mutually agreed relationship 
agreement between these two international organisations. Article II of the agreement states 
that the UN and the OPCW recognise the need to work jointly to achieve mutual objectives. 
The two IOs agree to cooperate closely within their respective mandates, to consult on matters 
of mutual interest and concern, and cooperate with each other in accordance with the 
provisions of their respective constituent instruments171. Under Article XIV of the relationship 
agreement, the UN SG and the OPCW DG are allowed to make supplementary arrangements 
and develop the needed practical measures to the implementation of the agreement172.  
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The working relationship of the OPCW and the UN has developed over the course of the 
various operations during the war in Syria, and included the establishment of the above-
mentioned supplementary agreements and practical measures. Starting from the OPCW 
supporting the UN SG mechanism launched to investigate the alleged CW use incidents in 
Syria in 2013 as well as the subsequent UN-OPCW joint operation to remove the declared 
Syrian CW arsenal, the investigative actions later evolved to the establishment of the OPCW 
FFM in Syria in 2014. In 2015, the UN SC expressed is support for the continued work of the 
OPCW FFM173. Finally, the OPCW-UN JIM was created to identify the perpetrators of CW 
use based on the work of the OPCW FFM - where the FFM had determined that a specific 
incident in the SAR involved or likely involved the use of CWs174. These highly demanding 
operational activities have proved the two IOs being able work jointly to achieve mutual 
objectives, as their cooperation agreement entails, each complementing the other’s work and 
competences with their own.  
Concerning the primary research question of this study, whether the fact-finding in the cases 
of alleged use of CWs with the objective to attribute liability to states is within the scope and 
competence of the OPCW, the inspection of the relationship agreement of these two 
autonomous IOs, or the tasks and duties of the UN alone does not provide a very complete 
picture. While it is true, that the UN SC by the UN Charter Chapter V carries the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as the capability 
to bind the UN member states and enforce its decisions, it remains equally true that the 
OPCW is established by the CWC with the purpose and task to supervise compliance to the 
CWC treaty. Should the UN SC make binding decisions that put the obligations of UN 
member states under these in conflict with the obligations of the CWC state parties under the 
CWC, by UN Charter Article 103 the UN SC decisions would prevail. Although the UN SC 
terminated the UN-OPCW JIM with the specific mandate to attribute CW use in the SAR to 
individuals and entities, the possibility that the SC would reach any resolution to actively 
hinder the OPCW from carrying out such activities by the OPCW’s own initiative seems 
unlikely. This is simply because such decision would require the concurring vote of the SC 
permanent members, and the UK among others, including France and the USA, drafted the 
decision C-SS-4/Dec.3. 
Concerning investigating the alleged use of CWs by a state party to the CWC treaty, the 
mechanisms established within the CWC for investigating alleged use, as a later development 
of treaty law, can be seen to be intended to replace the UN SG mechanism, created long 
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before the CWC was negotiated. In the next chapter, the authority of the OPCW to investigate 
alleged CW use in Syria in order to attribute responsibility to those who use them as outlined 
in CSP decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 is examined in the context of expressly conferred powers - 
through what the CWC treaty text explicitly states on purpose, structure and competences of 
the OPCW, as well the particular functions and powers of the OPCW individual organs. In 
addition, the authority and scope of the OPCW are briefly discussed in the broader context of 
attributed and implied powers of international organisations. The focus of this discussion is in 
the situations involving alleged use of chemical weapons.  
 
3.2 OPCW authority to investigate alleged CW use with the objective to attribute 
responsibility 
 
3.2.1 The powers and scope of activities of the OPCW under the CWC 
 
The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the OPCW, is established in the 
Article VIII (1) of the CWC175. Paragraph 1 of Article VIII stipulates that the responsibility of 
the organisation is to ensure that the CWC is implemented. Paragraph 6 of the Preamble of the 
convention emphasises that the objectives and purpose of the convention are reached through 
the implementation of its provisions. Therefore, every implementation action by the 
organisation must be aimed at achieving the overall objective and purpose of the treaty. 
Likewise, all questions about the interpretation and application of the CWC must be answered 
in light of the objective and purpose of the treaty.176 
The tasks and duties of the OPCW are set out in its constitutional Article VIII of the CWC. 
The elaboration of these tasks in Article VIII is very broad, and does not define, but neither 
rules out on, any specific operational activities by the organisation. Rather, the general 
description of the tasks of the organisation as laid out in Article VIII (1) puts all focus to the 
duty of the OPCW to why the organisation was established: 
“…to achieve the objective and purpose of this Convention…” 
When the research question whether the decision to investigate alleged use cases in order to 
attribute responsibility to the perpetrators of chemical weapons use in the SAR is within the 
scope and competence of the OPCW is examined in the light of the objectives and purpose of 
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the CWC, the result seems to be a clear yes. First and foremost, these activities are intended to 
uphold the international law which comprehensively prohibits the development, production, 
stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons through a customary norm that has built over 
centuries, as well as through treaty law developed during the 20th century. The objective and 
purpose of the CWC, the treaty that confers the implementing organisation OPCW its powers, 
is to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons177. Furthermore, the 
process is involved with investigating alleged use of CWs, which would be a particularly 
grave violation of this international norm as well as that of the CWC treaty. More specifically, 
the use of CWs in Syria has already been confirmed through the previous work of the FFM 
that was established by the DG of the OPCW. Even further, a part of these incidents of CW 
use have been deemed to have been carried out by the SAR government, a state party to the 
CWC.  
The use of implied powers as a sole basis of adoption of functions by an international 
organisation is somewhat problematic, however, as it has the possibility to violate the 
principle of attributed powers based on the consent of member states. A general proposition of 
the international law is that the rules of law can generally be made on the basis of consent of 
states only. Implied powers doctrine seems to suggest that organisations can engage in 
activities regardless of state consent, perhaps even in opposition to the interests of some or all 
of the organisations member states. Therefore, the implied powers must arise from “necessary 
implication”, and they must be able to be tracked to the intention and consent of the states. In 
other words, the implied powers must be rooted to the intention of the treaty drafters.178  
The CWC states parties have consented to be bound by the treaty of the CWC, with the 
objective and purpose of total elimination of chemical weapons. The CWC state parties have 
delegated the tasks related to implementation of the CWC to the OPCW, an organisation 
created solely for this purpose. The most significant part of the implementation and one of the 
distinctive hallmarks of the CWC is its comprehensive mechanism for verification of 
compliance, as laid out in the treaty Articles. As examined in detail in the following chapters 
of this study, the provisions of the CWC cover the functional mechanisms for fact-finding, 
intended to clarify and resolve whether any non-compliance to the treaty has occurred 
including cases of alleged use, as well as measures to redress situations where non-compliance 
has been established. It can therefore be envisaged that it is essential for the OPCW, in order 
to carry out its implementation duties as laid out in the CWC, to have the powers to attribute 
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cases of alleged CW use to a CWC state party during its compliance verification activities. 
This is needed in order to determine whether the state party in question is in compliance to the 
treaty. Attribution of responsibility to the perpetrators of CWs is therefore needed in the light 
of why the organisation was created and by necessary implication, seems to be well within the 
powers of the OPCW.  
 
 
3.2.2 The CWC provisions on investigating alleged CW use cases  
 
As discussed earlier, one of the hallmarks of the CWC is it comprehensive mechanism for 
verification of compliance. The subject of this study concerns with the OPCW powers to 
investigate alleged use of CWs, and the examination below concentrates on the CWC 
provisions on investigating alleged CW use cases as a part of verification of compliance to the 
treaty. Several different mechanisms for addressing suspected or observed non-compliance to 
the treaty are outlined in the CWC Article IX. Regarding general principles of initiating these 
processes, each state party to the convention has the possibility to initiate steps to address any 
compliance concerns179. Negotiations can be conducted in mutual co-operation between states 
parties by one party requesting clarification from the other on the subject in hand. A request 
can also be made by a SP to the OPCW EC to address the issue. As a last and most intrusive 
option, any CWC state party has also the right to request a challenge inspection to be carried 
out for clarifying and resolving questions concerning possible non-compliance180.  
Article IX of the CWC titled Consultations, cooperation and fact-finding describes the 
principles laid out in the CWC to establish facts to prove whether activities are intended for 
purposes not prohibited, and to resolve any doubts the CWC SPs may have towards other SPs’ 
compliance with their obligations. Article IX focuses on challenge inspections and ad hoc 
procedures rather than routine procedures, and the procedures for compliance control as laid 
out in Article IX should be separated from both routine inspections, and dispute settlement. 
This distinction is important because of the different trigger mechanisms involved, and also in 
respect of the procedural steps and principles applied. The article includes procedures for 
requesting clarification from other state parties in cases of suspected non-compliance, as well 
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as procedures for challenge inspections. The purpose and the end-state of the procedures 
described in Article IX is the restoration of confidence in compliance, or identifying non-
compliance and subsequently redressing the situation.181  
Article X of the CWC titled Assistance and protection against chemical weapons contributes 
to the security of the CWC SPs. The Article provides for effective chemical protection of the 
SPs in response to threats that may emanate from a state not party to the convention, or a 
CWC SP in violation of its fundamental obligations regarding the convention. Article X is 
also of importance when threats posed by non-state actors are considered. Article X confirms 
the right of the CWC SPs to defend themselves against the use or threat of use of CWs. 
Furthermore, the Article establishes mechanisms to improve SPs protective capabilities, as 
well as to deliver assistance through the OPCW to a SP falling victim to CW use. Concerning 
the alleged use of CWs, the Article contains the procedure leading to investigations of alleged 
use, when a SP considers that CWs have been used against it.182 
The essential tools for clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-
compliance to the treaty as well as addressing alleged use of chemical weapons are 
inspections, dispatched by the OPCW DG. In general, the OPCW conducts three types of 
inspections for the verification of compliance to the CWC: routine inspections of chemical 
weapons-related facilities and chemical industry facilities; short-notice challenge inspections 
according to Article IX, which can be conducted at any location in any SP about which 
another SP has concerns regarding possible non-compliance; and investigations of alleged use 
of CWs pursuant to Article X183.  
The detailed procedures followed in these inspections are laid out in the CWC Annex on 
Implementation and verification, the Verification Annex. The procedures for short-notice 
challenge inspections requested by a state party pursuant to the Article IX of the convention 
are described in Verification Annex Part X. However, paragraph 19 of the Article IX states 
that challenge inspections based on alleged use are to be conducted in accordance with 
Verification Annex Part XI entitled Investigations in cases of alleged use of chemical 
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weapons. Part XI of the Verification Annex therefore governs the investigations carried out in 
cases of alleged use of chemical weapons under either Article IX, Consultations, cooperation 
and fact-finding, or Article X, Assistance and protection against CWs. It should be noted, that 
the Annexes are an integral part of the convention, and not in a subsidiary position regarding 
the CWC body text. Any reference to the CWC includes the annexes184. 
Investigations of alleged CW use pursuant to CWC Articles IX or X follow similar procedures 
laid out in the Verification Annex Part XI. However, their primary objectives completely 
differ. Article X is invoked by a SP in order to receive assistance when chemical weapons 
have been used or threatened to be used against it. Under Article X, the objective of the 
alleged use investigations is therefore merely to establish whether chemical weapons were 
used in order to establish if the SP has the right to receive assistance and to assess what types 
of assistance are needed, without identifying any state or non-state actor as the aggressor. 
Under Article IX, the investigations of alleged use have the purpose of clarifying and 
resolving noncompliance by a SP alleged of having used CWs. For an alleged use challenge 
inspection on the basis of Article IX, it is therefore imperative to obtain sufficient facts to 
clarify above any reasonable doubt that CWs have been used by the SP alleged in the 
request.185 The OPCW must therefore attribute the use of CWs to the SP in question through 
its technical investigative actions in order for the non-compliance by a SP (use of CWs) to be 
established. The inspections contribute to technical attribution, the factual and technical 
investigation both in terms of who the likely perpetrator is and the degree of certainty with 
which this can be established186. In addition to the investigations, attribution of non-
compliance to the SP in question requires politico-legal evaluation, conducted by the EC. This 
is discussed in the following chapter. 
The process of investigation of alleged use, as laid out in Articles IX and X and detailed in the 
Verification Annex Part XI, provides the OPCW with a robust tool to address the most grave 
violations of the treaty, the alleged use of CWs. As set out in CWC in the Verification Annex 
Part XI187, investigations into the sites of the alleged CW use are to be granted access to all 
sites the inspection team deems relevant to the effective investigation of the alleged use. A 
state party to the convention cannot refuse a challenge inspection requested pursuant to the 
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Article IX188. Even further, the Part XI of the Verification Annex explicitly mentions that this 
investigation process is to be used for identification of the origin of any chemical weapons 
used. The Verification Annex Part XI Chapter D, Reports, paragraph 26 states, that: 
 “If the inspection team collects through, inter alia, identification of any impurities or 
other substances during laboratory analysis of samples taken, any information in the 
course of its investigation that might serve to identify the origin of any chemical weapons 
used, that information shall be included in the report.” 
 
The primary research question of this study, whether the investigation of cases of alleged use 
of CWs in Syria with the objective to attribute liability to the state is within the competences 
of the OPCW as they are set out in the CWC treaty can be examined aligned with the 
provisions of the CWC presented above. The SAR is involved in an internal armed conflict 
where chemical weapons have verifiably been used, and a part of these incidents of CW use 
have already been attributed to the SAR government, a state party to the CWC. Through its 
technical and expert work under the OPCW TS, the investigations conducted by the FFM 
have previously confirmed the use of chlorine, sulfur mustard, and sarin as weapons in the 
SAR. However, analogous to an investigation into the alleged use of CWs under Article X, 
the FFM has not been vested with a mandate or an objective to identify who used these 
chemical weapons. In decision C-SS-4/Dec.3, the operative paragraph 10 of the decision 
mandated the OPCW TS to put in place arrangements to identify the perpetrators of the use of 
chemical weapons in the SAR by “identifying and reporting on all information potentially 
relevant to the origin of those chemical weapons”. In this, the decision invoked the provision 
of the Verification Annex Part XI explicitly dealing with establishing the origin of the CWs 
during investigations of alleged use cases.  
In the landscape of the activities involving investigating alleged CW use as outlined in the 
CWC, the attribution mechanism established by the decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 can be seen to 
form a part of an alleged use investigation process, continuing and complementing the fact-
finding work of the FFM. The final outcome of these activities is aimed at clarifying and 
resolving whether any non-compliance by a SP to the CWC has occurred, the process of 
which is outlined in Article IX of the CWC. However, an important question regarding the 
CSP decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 therefore remains why the OPCW member states have pursued 
addressing the situation via the ad hoc route of via a decision by a general vote in the CSP. 
The preferred route for investigating alleged CW use, clearly defined under Article IX of the 
CWC is another SP to the CWC submitting a request for challenge inspection for 
                                            
188 Article IX (10): “For the purpose of verifying compliance with the provisions of this Convention, each State 
Party shall permit the Technical Secretariat to conduct the on-site challenge inspection…” OPCW 2005 
        
 
57
investigation for alleged use. In addition, there is a possibility of the SAR itself requesting 
investigations for alleged use under Article X. 
Investigations under Article X can be triggered by request of a SP against whom CWs have 
been used. Although the SAR in 2013 asked the UN SG to launch an urgent investigation to 
the alleged use of CWs in Syria under the auspices of his mechanism189, the SAR has more 
recently stated that the CW use in Syria is due to “terrorist proxies that have been trained, 
financed and provided with chemical weapons to stage incidents and stir up and inflame 
international public opinion against the Syrian government”190. In cases of CW attacks Syria, 
as a SP to the CWC, is entitled to receive assistance against the use of chemical weapons 
under the Article X of the CWC. However, this would include investigations set out in the 
CWC Verification Annex to establish whether the use of CWs has occurred and to assess 
what types of assistance are needed. As it has been established that the SAR government is 
responsible of using CWs against its own people in part of the CW use incidents191, it is 
therefore understandable that the SP in question, Syria, is not requesting assistance pursuant to 
Article X of the CWC, warranting detailed investigations to take place. 
Another SP to the CWC requesting a challenge inspection under Article IX for alleged use of 
CWs by SAR when an incident involving CWs emerges is another an option. However, 
challenge inspections have not been utilised throughout the history of the CWC. Most 
prominent reason for this that can be derived from the inspection of the CWC treaty text, is 
that the CWC highlights consultations and cooperation as the primary means of resolving 
doubts of non-compliance. Article IX of the CWC192 states that whenever possible, the SPs 
should first make “every effort” to clarify and resolve any matter causing doubts about 
compliance among themselves through exchange of information and consultations. However, 
the Article IX (2) also explicitly states that this is without prejudice to the right of any SP to 
request a challenge inspection, and that cooperation is to be used whenever possible. 
Therefore, while the text of the CWC in general highlights cooperation and consultation in 
solving any doubts concerning compliance, it does not clearly define the extent of these, 
neither places them as a prerequisite to issuing a challenge inspection request.  
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Another consideration that may hinder other SPs initiating a challenge inspection subsequent 
to an alleged use incident is the possibility of retaliatory challenge inspection requests. Article 
IX193 of the CWC puts out provisions to prevent this kind of abuse of the challenge inspection 
system. The EC can decide by a three-quarter majority of its members against carrying out a 
requested challenge inspection. This is to be done if the EC considers the inspection request to 
be frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope of the convention. Neither the requesting nor 
the inspected SP, if a member of the EC, can participate in the making of such a decision.  
A challenge inspection, initiated by another CWC SP pursuant to the Article IX of the 
convention, is a detailed mechanism for clarifying and resolving whether use of chemical 
weapons by a CWC SP has occurred. Investigations of alleged use pursuant to the Article IX 
follow the processes described in Part XI of the Verification Annex. Part XI (D) 26 of the 
Verification Annex explicitly mentions that the alleged use investigation process is to be 
utilised to identify the origin of any chemical weapons used. It can therefore be seen, that fact-
finding in the cases of alleged use of CWs with the objective to attribute liability to a state is 
clearly outlined in the CWC, in the context of challenge inspections for clarifying and 
resolving suspected non-compliance pursuant to Article IX. Concerning the attribution of 
responsibility to the CW use in the SAR, a challenge inspection initiated by other OPCW 
member states would therefore seem as a natural, yet unused option in case of emerging CW 
use cases in the area. Alleged use investigations following the clearly described core processes 
of the CWC, instead of ad hoc arrangements, would likely leave less room for political debate 
and division among the OPCW member states. 
 
3.2.3 The CWC provisions on the OPCW powers to establish that a treaty violation has 
occurred 
 
Criticism directed towards decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 included arguments that the CWC does not 
contain any provision that states that the OPCW, or its policy-making organs have a mandate 
to establish a violation of an obligation under the CWC194. These questions are also relevant 
concerning the legal effects of the attribution decision C-SS-4/Dec.3. Based on the Chapter 
3.2.2 examination of the mechanisms for investigating alleged use of CWs as set out in the 
CWC Articles and the Verification Annex, it is clear that the drafters of the CWC intended the 
treaty to be well equipped to deal with situations where a state party is suspected to be in 
violation of its treaty obligations. The factual and technical investigations by the TS according 
to Verification Annex Part XI of the CWC are an integral part of these processes. The final 
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objective of the procedures under Article IX is to establish facts to resolve any doubts the 
CWC SPs may have towards other SPs’ compliance with their obligations. In addition to the 
investigations, attribution of non-compliance to the SP in question requires legal and political 
assessment on the outcome of the investigations. As set out in the CWC, this is the task and 
duty of the EC.  
In general, the EC is in charge of managing the procedures for a SP requesting clarification 
from another SP concerning doubt of non-compliance195. In the cases of challenge inspections 
pursuant to Article IX, the requesting SP presents an inspection request for an on-site 
challenge inspection to the EC, and simultaneously, to the OPCW DG196. At this point, the EC 
has a task of considering and deciding on the merits of the request and whether the inspection 
is within the scope of the convention197. Although the OPCW DG is responsible for 
dispatching the inspection, the EC keeps the case under its consideration throughout the 
inspection procedure198. After the OPCW DG has submitted the final report concerning the 
inspection, as set out in the Article IX (22) the EC decides on whether any non-compliance 
has occurred; whether the request had been within the scope of the CWC; and whether the 
right to request a challenge inspection had been abused199. 
Paragraph IX (22) and the following paragraph 23 illustrate the two distinct powers of the EC 
in addressing the procedural appropriateness of the challenge inspection, as well as 
substantively addressing the outcome of the inspection. The distinction of these two is 
important as the procedural review is governed primarily via legal considerations, but the 
assessment of the outcome is more of a political process. Paragraph 22 (a) on EC addressing 
whether any non-compliance has occurred mandates the EC to make this politico-legal 
assessment on how the facts in the inspection team’s final report relate to the obligations of 
the inspected state party under the CWC.200 
The work of the IIT mechanism established after decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 to extend fact-finding 
concerning the cases of CW use to attribute liability to the perpetrators in Syria does not 
follow the processes of either a challenge inspection under Article IX, or the alleged use 
investigations outlined in Article X. Rather, the decision text reverted to the Article VIII 
                                                                                                                                        
194 See OPCW CSP SS4 NAT 17, 2018; OPCW CSP SS4 NAT 40, 2018; OPCW CSP SS4 NAT 54, 2018 
195 Article IX (3-7), OPCW, 2005 
196 Article IX (13), OPCW, 2005 
197 Article IX (17): ”The Executive Council may, not later than 12 hours after having received the inspection 
request, decide by a three-quarter majority of all its members against carrying out the challenge inspection, if it 
considers the inspection request to be frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope of this Convention … If the 
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paragraphs on the general powers and functions of the respective OPCW organs, establishing 
an ad hoc mechanism. The decision recalled paragraph 37 on that the TS is to carry out the 
verification measures provided for in the CWC, as well as paragraph 40 on that the TS is to 
inform the EC of any doubts, ambiguities or uncertainties about compliance with the CWC 
that have come to its notice in the performance of its verification activities201. The general 
tasks and duties of the OPCW organs as set out in the CWC, aligned with the apparent 
functions of the IIT mechanism, will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
After non-compliance of a CWC SP has been established, Article XII of the CWC titled 
“Measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions” describes 
measures that the OPCW CSP can take to remedy situations of non-compliance. Such 
measures may include restricting or suspending a state party’s rights and privileges under the 
CWC until it conforms to its obligations, or recommending collective measures to other states 
parties in accordance with the international law202. In particularly grave cases, the CSP may 
bring the issue, along with any relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the 
UN GA and the UN SC203. The stipulations of the Article XII concern CSP actions in 
situations where a state party has been established to be in violation of its obligations to the 
treaty. In cases of the OPCW investigating alleged use of CWs by a CWC state party, 
attribution of the CW use to the SP alleged for using CWs through the technical inspections of 
the TS, as well as the politico-legal assessment of the EC, is therefore a clear prerequisite for 
taking any of the measures set out in the Article XII.  
 
3.3 Powers and functions of the OPCW organs versus the mechanism established 
by decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 
 
The legal effects of the decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 can also be examined from the perspective 
how the tasks allocated to the different OPCW organs in the decision balance with the powers, 
functions and tasks of the respective organs, as they are set out in the treaty. This is important, 
because the whole scope of competence of an international organisation and the powers 
conferred to its individual organs rely on the constituent instruments, based on the states 
parties’ consent. The general powers and functions of the OPCW main organs, the CSP, the 
EC and the TC, are set out in the CWC Article VIII entitled the Organization. Concerning 
investigating alleged use of CWs, the responsibilities, tasks and duties of the individual 
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organs are further elaborated in the treaty Article IX on consultations, cooperation and fact-
finding, Article X on assistance and protection against chemical weapons, and the Verification 
Annex Part XI. 
The powers and functions of the Conference of the State Parties are set out in paragraphs 19 
through 22 of Article VIII. The CSP is the principal organ of the OPCW, and oversees the 
implementation of the CWC as a whole. The CSP can consider any questions, matters or 
issues within the scope of the CWC, including those relating to the powers and functions of 
the EC and the TS. It can also make recommendations and take decisions on any questions, 
matters or issues related to the CWC. These may be raised by a SP, or brought to its attention 
by the EC. In addition, the CSP oversees the activities of the EC and the TS and may issue 
guidelines to either of them in the exercise of their functions.204 In cases of doubts of non-
compliance, the specific tasks of the CSP as set out in Articles IX and X relate to the decision-
making powers of the CSP. A SP has the right to request, if supported by one third of the SPs, 
the CSP to convene in a special session and consider doubts or concerns about possible non-
compliance and measures it deems appropriate to resolve the situation205. If the EC has made 
specific recommendations to the CSP after the EC reaching conclusions on whether any non-
compliance has occurred, the CSP considers the appropriate action in accordance with Article 
XII, measures to redress a situation206. 
The powers and functions of the Executive Council are set out in paragraphs 30 through 36 of 
the Article VIII. The EC is the executive organ of the OPCW, responsible to the CSP, who has 
the right to delegate functions to the EC. The EC supervises the activities of the TS, and 
cooperates with the national authorities of the SPs. The EC also facilitates consultations and 
cooperation among SPs at their request. The EC has functions concerning establishing 
compliance and non-compliance to the treaty, set out of in the statutory provisions of Article 
VIII. In general, the need for such an executive organ arises mainly from the requirements of 
agility concerning decision-making, in particular concerning the need to deal with compliance 
concerns. The EC has a duty to consider issues or matters within its competence affecting the 
CWC and its implementation, including concerns regarding compliance, and cases of non-
compliance. If the EC considers further action to be necessary, it can take measures including 
bringing the issue to the attention of the CSP as well as recommending the CSP to take 
measures to ensure compliance. Furthermore, Article VIII (36) stipulates that the OPCW EC 
will, in cases of particular gravity and urgency, bring the issue, including relevant information 
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and conclusions, directly to the attention of the UN GA and the UN SC, and inform all CWC 
SPs of this step.  
The Technical Secretariat assists the CSP and the EC in the performance of their functions. 
The powers and functions of the TS and the OPCW DG are laid out in Article VIII paragraphs 
37-47. The TS carries out the verification measures provided for in the CWC. Functions may 
be delegated to the TS both by the CSP and the EC. Concerning compliance to the treaty, the 
TS has the duty to report to the EC any doubts about compliance that have come to its notice 
in the performance of its verification activities, and that it has been unable to resolve or clarify 
through its consultations with the SP concerned.207  
The OPCW Director-General is the chief administrative officer of the TS, responsible in their 
actions to the CSP and the EC. The tasks and duties of the OPCW DG regarding verifying 
compliance to the treaty and investigating alleged use of CWs are numerous, as set out in 
Articles IX, X and the Verification Annex. The verification Annex Part XI (A) (1) explicitly 
places the responsibility for establishing detailed procedures of investigations of alleged use 
of chemical weapons, initiated pursuant to Articles IX or X of the CWC, to the OPCW DG208. 
Based on the aforementioned stipulations on the CWC on the powers and functions of the 
OPCW main organs in issues concerning compliance, the general sequence of operations 
involving cases of suspected non-compliance can be outlined as follows. The TS carries out 
the practical verification duties such as investigations on behalf of the OPCW, and reports to 
the EC on the matters of compliance that it has not been able to resolve in the course of its 
own work. The EC considers these, makes decisions concerning whether any non-compliance 
has occurred, and forwards to the CSP any issues in which the EC considers further action to 
be necessary. In addition, the EC has an independent power to forward serious issues directly 
to the attention of the UN GA and the UN SC. The CSP, as the principal decision-making 
organ of the OPCW, has the final say concerning the actions taken in cases of non-
compliance, based on the conclusions and recommendations of the EC. The competence of the 
CSP, however, includes any substance matters entrusted to both EC and the TS. 
The CSP decision C-SS-4/Dec.3209 established an ad hoc mechanism based on the framework 
of the general powers and functions conferred to the OPCW organs. In the decision operative 
paragraph 10, the CSP decided that the TS will put in place arrangements to identify the 
perpetrators of the use of CWs in the SAR by “identifying and reporting on all information 
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potentially relevant to the origin of those chemical weapons”. According to the same 
paragraph the TS is to provide regular reports on its investigations to the CSP and to the UN 
SG for their consideration. Furthermore, operative paragraph 12 stated that the TS is to 
preserve and provide information to the UN IIIM as well as to any relevant investigatory 
entities established under the auspices of the UN. In the decision operative paragraph 24, the 
CSP decided that the OPCW DG is to provide a copy of the decision and a report on its initial 
implementation to all CWC SPs and the UN SG, and thereafter provide a report on progress to 
each regular session of the EC.  
 
Powers of the OPCW organs 
concerning compliance matters 
under CWC Article VIII 
Decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 Tasks and due process of the OPCW 
organs under the CWC  
In VIII (19) the CSP is given a power 
to consider and take decisions on any 
questions, matters or issues within the 
scope of CWC, including those 
relating to the powers and functions of 
the EC and the TS. 
In VIII (20) the CSP is given a power 
to review compliance with CWC, 
oversee the activities of the EC and the 
TS, and issue guidelines to either of 
them in the exercise of their functions. 
In VIII (21) (f) the CSP is given a 
power to establish such subsidiary 
organs as it finds necessary for the 
exercise of its functions 
In VIII (21) (k) the CSP is given a 
power to take the necessary measures 
to ensure compliance with CWC and to 
redress and remedy any situation which 
contravenes the provisions of the CWC 
In VIII (30) the EC is given a power to 
carry out the powers and functions 
entrusted to it under the CWC, as well 
as those functions delegated to it by the 
CSP. The EC is responsible to the CSP 
and must act in conformity with the 
recommendations, decisions and 
guidelines of the CSP 
In VIII (31) the EC is given a power to 
promote the effective implementation 
of, and compliance with, the CWC and 
a power to supervise the TS 
In VIII (35) the EC is given a power to 
consider any issue or matter within its 
competence affecting the CWC and its 
implementation, including concerns 
regarding compliance, and cases of 
non-compliance 
 
4th SS CSP was convened by 
request of SPs1 
CSP SS4 convened and by a 2/3 
majority decision, authorised1: 
The TS to put in place 
arrangements to identify 
perpetrators of CW use in Syria 
(op. para 10)  
The TS is to provide regular 
reports on its investigations to the 
CSP and to the UN SG for their 
consideration. (op. para 10) 
The TS is to preserve and provide 
information to the UN IIIM as well 
as to any relevant investigatory 
entities established under the 
auspices of the UN. (op. para 12) 
The OPCW DG is to provide a 
copy of the decision and a report 
on its initial implementation to 
CWC SPs and the UN SG, and 
thereafter provide a report on 
progress to each regular session of 
the EC. (op. para 24) 
In VIII (12) (c) it is stated that Special 
sessions of the CSP will be convened 
when requested by any member and 
supported by one third of the members 
In VIII (16-17) it is stated that majority 
of the members of the OPCW 
constitute a quorum for the CSP, with 
each member of the OPCW having one 
vote in the CSP 
In VIII (18) it is stated that CSP takes 
decisions on matters of substance as far 
as possible by consensus. If consensus 
is not possible at the end of 24 hours, 
the CSP is to take decision by a two-
thirds majority of members present and 
voting  
In VIII (37) the TS is tasked to assist 
the CSP and the EC in the performance 
of their functions and carry out the 
verification measures, other functions 
entrusted to it, as well as those 
functions delegated to it by the CSP 
and the EC 
In VIII (38) (b) the TS is tasked to 
prepare such reports as the CSP or the 
EC may request 
In VIII (40) the TS is tasked to inform 
the EC of any problem that has arisen 
with regard to the discharge of its 
functions, including doubts, 
ambiguities or uncertainties about 
compliance with the CWC that have 
come to its notice in the performance 
of its verification activities  
In VIII (35) the EC is tasked to bring 
the issues affecting the CWC and its 
implementation to the attention of the 
SPs and CSP as appropriate 
In VIII (36) the EC is tasked to take 
measures, if it deems further action to 
be necessary while it considers 
concerns regarding compliance and 
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cases of non-compliance, including 
bringing the issue to the attention of 
the CSP and making recommendations 
to the CSP 
In VIII (36) the EC is tasked to bring 
in cases of particular gravity and 
urgency, the issues, including relevant 
information and conclusions, directly 
to the attention of the UN GA and the 
UN SC 
In XII (1) the CSP is tasked to take the 
necessary measures listed in (2-4) to 
ensure compliance with the CWC and 
to redress situations which contravene 
the provisions of the CWC. These 
include bringing the issue, including 
relevant information and conclusions, 
to the attention of the UN GA and the 
UN SC 
 
 
Figure 4. Outline of the powers and tasks of the OPCW organs in matters concerning 
compliance as set out in the CWC, together with the operative paragraphs of the CSP decision 
C-SS-4/Dec.3 establishing the mechanism for identifying perpetrators of CW use in Syria. 1: 
OPCW CSP SS4, 2018 
 
Figure 4 presents the powers and tasks of the OPCW organs in matters concerning 
compliance, discussed in this and the previous chapter, aligned with the paragraphs of 
decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 establishing the mechanism for identifying perpetrators of CW use in 
Syria. Based on this examination, the established attribution mechanism can be seen to follow 
closely the respective mandates, as well as the tasks, duties and responsibilities allocated to 
the OPCW organs in the treaty Article VIII.  
 
 
3.3.1 Decision-making in the CSP - procedural and voting requirements 
 
The CSP rules and procedures for how meetings are conducted, and how decisions are made, 
are laid out in the CWC Article VIII, titled Organisation, in Chapter B, the Conference of the 
States Parties. In addition, the CSP in its first session approved the rules of procedure for the 
conference. These have been later amended by the 3rd review conference of the CSP210. To 
reach a quorum, a majority of the CWC state parties must be present at the CSP meeting211. 
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Based on the 4th SS CSP meeting report212, it can be concluded that of the 193 CWC member 
states, 152 state parties were present at the 4th SS CSP, with 106 state parties voting, and 46 
state parties abstaining from voting in conjunction in making the decision. The numbers 
indicate that the decision C-4-SS/Dec.3 was made in compliance to this CSP procedural 
requirement regarding quorum.  
CSP makes decisions on questions of procedure by a simple majority of members present and 
voting. If the decision is very substantive, decisions should, if possible, be taken by consensus. 
If consensus is not readily attained in the meeting, effort is made to facilitate consensus by 
different negotiation mechanisms. However, paragraph 18 of the Article VIII states that if 
consensus is not reached, the CSP may still take a decision by a two-thirds majority of 
members present and voting.213 According to the rule 71 of the rules of procedure of the 
CSP214, the phrase “Members present and voting” means members casting a valid affirmative 
or negative vote, and abstaining members are not counted as voting. Of the 106 states parties 
participating at the vote, 82 state parties voted for, and 24 against adopting the decision215, 
reaching the required two-thirds majority of members present and voting.  
Regarding the decision C-4-SS/Dec.3, the adherence of the 4th SS CSP to the obligation to 
pursue consensus stated in the CWC Article VIII paragraph 18 remains somewhat unclear, as 
the 4th SS CSP documentation publicly available at the OPCW website, such as the report of 
the meeting, do not describe how the efforts to reach consensus were facilitated. The two-day 
timeframe of the meeting does allow for the 24-hour period of deferment outlined in the 
Article VIII (18). Orakhelashvili216 reported contacting the OPCW public affairs office on the 
subject of facilitating reaching consensus at the meeting and receiving a statement that “all 
rules and procedures were followed by the states parties at the 4th SS of the CSP”.  
Concerning the research question, whether the finding in the cases of alleged use of CWs with 
the objective to attribute liability to states within the scope and competence of the OPCW, the 
fact that the decision has been taken following the necessary procedural requirements of the 
organisation provides only limited insight. The question whether a resolution has been duly 
adopted from a procedural point of view, and the question whether that resolution is within 
                                            
212 OPCW CSP SS4, 2018 
213 OPCW, 2019. Also Article VIII (18): “Decisions on matters of substance should be taken as far as possible by 
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the scope and authority of an international organisation, has been seen as two separate issues 
in the international case law such as the aforementioned ICJ advisory opinion on the legality 
of use by state of nuclear weapons in armed conflict from 1996217. However, violations of 
established procedural and voting requirements would be an obvious target for challenging the 
decision and as such, warrant examination considering the subject of this study.  
 
 
3.4 Can the change in OPCW tasks be interpreted as an amendment of the 
treaty? 
 
Amendment of a treaty means an alteration of the provisions of the treaty, which produces 
effects on all of the treaty parties. As treaties are consensual acts and amendments involve 
new obligations for the member states, any amendments must be approved by the state’s 
treaty-making authorities. In effect, an amendment to a treaty gives birth to a new treaty. 
Treaty amendment and modification procedures are presented in the VCLT Articles 39 
through 41. Article 39 stipulates that treaties may be amended by agreement between the 
parties, and that the general rules laid down in VCLT Part II apply to such an agreement 
except insofar as the treaty may otherwise provide. Article 40 describes how the amendment 
of multilateral treaties is governed. Article 41 is concerned with agreements to modify 
multilateral treaties between certain state parties only218.  
In the CWC, special rules on amendment have been explicitly adopted, creating lex specialis, 
that supersedes the general rules of the VCLT. The provisions for treaty amendment are laid 
out in Article XV titled Amendments. Article XV makes a distinction between an amendment 
to the convention and a change, the former subject to the procedures in Article XV paragraphs 
2 and 3, and the latter subject to the procedures presented in Article XV paragraph 5. All SPs 
have the right to propose an amendment or a change to the treaty. The procedures for the 
adoption of amendments and for the adoption of changes differ substantially. Changes are 
considered to be related only to matters of an administrative or technical nature, and they can 
considered for the treaty Annexes only. However, Sections A and C of the Confidentiality 
Annex, Part X of the Verification Annex, and those definitions in Part I of the Verification 
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Annex which relate exclusively to challenge inspections, can not be subject to change 
protocols219.  
Amendments to the CWC can be considered by an Amendment Conference (AC) only. The 
text of a proposed amendment is submitted to the depositary as well as the OPCW DG for 
circulation to all SPs. An AC is convened if one third or more of the SPs notify the OPCW 
DG that they support further consideration of the proposal. Amendments enter into force for 
all SPs when they have been adopted by the AC by a positive vote of a majority of all SPs 
with no SP casting a negative vote, and 30 days after deposition of the instruments of 
ratification or acceptance by all the SPs casting a positive vote at the AC.220 
A change process can be initiated by submitting the text of the proposed changes to the 
OPCW DG. The OPCW communicates the proposals and information to all SPs, the EC and 
the Depositary. OPCW DG evaluates the proposal to determine its consequences for the 
provisions and implementation of the CWC and communicates the information to all SPs and 
the EC. The EC examine the proposal in the light of all available information and notifies its 
recommendation to all SPs for consideration. If the EC recommends that the proposal is 
adopted, the proposal is considered approved if no SP objects to it within a given timeframe. 
Similarly, if the EC recommends that the proposal is rejected, it is considered rejected if no 
SP objects to the rejection. If a SP objects to either, the decision on the change is taken as a 
matter of substance by the CSP at its next session. It is the responsibility of the OPCW DG to 
notify SPs and the Depository on approval of changes. In general, changes approved under 
this procedure enter into force for all SPs 180 days after the date of notification by the OPCW 
of their approval.221 
As described, a formal amendment of a treaty is in general a very cumbersome process. 
Concerning the CWC specifically, an amendment to the convention would have various 
political, technical, military and economic implications. As making an amendment requires 
consensus, it is no use to start a formal amendment process without a clear indication of a 
common will for this among the state parties. Any amendment of the CWC to include new 
content with, for example, clearer provisions concerning attribution of CW use to their 
perpetrators, seems therefore impossible in the current political climate. Investigations of 
alleged use of chemical weapons, even when they are conducted as challenge inspections 
pursuant to Article IX, are conducted according to protocols laid out in Verification Annex 
Part XI, which is technically subject to a change protocol as defined by Article XV (4). 
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However, Article XV (4) rules that changes can be related only to matters of an administrative 
or technical nature. 
It should be noted, that even a formal treaty can be recognised to have been amended by 
informal means through subsequent practise. Informal modification of a treaty by subsequent 
practise is based on the concept that by applying a treaty, the parties implicitly agree on its 
content, and the common treaty bond that imposes a duty to speak out in case of a party 
disagrees with a certain conduct. Silence means consent. The relevant practise of the parties is 
not limited to all treaty parties but may be imputable to only some parties, and others tolerate 
it without objecting222. The VCLT general rules of treaty interpretation stipulate that any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation223. While the practise, in principal, must be accepted by state 
authorities permitted to engage the state through treaty relations, even practise of subordinate 
state organs contributes to these types of amendments. Higher authorities have to control the 
lower ones, and they will be considered to have acquiesced if they do not object to a practise 
for a prolonged period of time.224  
International organisations have long been seen to utilise informal amendment processes 
rather than formally amending their constitutional instruments. This flexibility and adaptation 
is essential in keeping treaties up to date in the changing world. Informal amendments may be 
initiated by utilising authoritative interpretations, by means of an intense use of the implied 
powers doctrine; under appeal to the subsequent practise, or through the adoption of internal 
policy papers or strategic documents225. Regardless of the discussion if a formal amendment 
to the CWC treaty is warranted over OPCW establishing mechanisms solely aimed at 
attribution of responsibility for alleged use of CWs, the adoption of the decision C-SS-
4/Dec.3, and its subsequent concordant implementation over years without formal actions 
from SP authorities could therefore be eventually seen to lead to an amendment to the 
convention through subsequent practise. From a legal point of view this would not be 
application of the CWC amendment Article XV, but the creation of a new norm on 
amendment by way of lex posterior for which all parties, acting together, elect to 
participate226. 
                                                                                                                                        
221 Article XV (5), OPCW, 2005 
222 Kolb, 2017, Ch 10, Modification, pp. 193-195 
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224 Kolb, 2017, Ch 10, Modification p. 195 
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3.4.1 Settlement of disputes arising from the interpretation of the CWC 
 
In general, interpretation of constituent instruments of international organisations may be 
carried out by judicial or arbitral tribunals. UN and UN specialised agencies may ask advisory 
opinions on legal questions arising within their scope or competence, including interpretation 
of their constituent instruments, from the ICJ. The constituent instrument of the organisation 
by itself may refer the disputes arising thereunder to international arbitration, or stipulate that 
any formal and definitive interpretation is to be carried out by a particular organ of the 
organisation. In addition, the organs of international organisations must have an understanding 
of their scope of function and powers for the purpose of carrying out their functions, which 
also creates a practical routine need for treaty interpretation. This can be done either formally 
and explicitly in a legal act of the organ, or impliedly - as a result of the practise of the 
organ.227 
Settlement of disputes arising from the application or interpretation of the CWC is set out in 
Article XIV of the convention, entitled the Settlement of disputes. In case of such a dispute 
between SPs, or between a SP and the OPCW, the parties involved must resolve the 
differences together, primarily by negotiation or by other peaceful means. The parties may 
also utilise the EC, the CSP or by mutual consent, the ICJ in the settlement of interpretation 
disputes228. According to the Article XIV (3), the EC can contribute to the settlement of a 
dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate. This includes offering its good offices, 
calling upon the parties to a dispute to start the settlement process of their choice, and 
recommending time limits for agreed procedures. The CSP, on the other hand, has the power 
to establish or entrust OPCW organs with tasks related to settlement of disputes, in 
conformity with Article VIII, paragraph 21 (f) as set out in Article XIV (4)229. Paragraph 6 of 
the Article XIV provides that the provisions of Article IX on consultation, cooperation and 
fact-finding prevail over this Article. This means that a procedure such as a challenge 
inspection initiated under Article IX cannot be blocked or delayed by initiating a dispute 
settlement process under Article XIV230. 
The adoption of the CSP decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 has created an obvious situation of dispute on 
the application of the CWC. Formal dispute settlement initiatives have not been made. 
                                            
227 Akande in Evans (2018) Ch 8, International organizations p. 236 
228 Article XIV (2-5), OPCW, 2005 
229 Article XIV (4), OPCW, 2005. Article VIII 21 (f): The Conference shall… Establish such subsidiary organs 
as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Convention” OPCW, 2005 
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However, some SPs have taken steps that suggest harnessing the CSP power to establish 
OPCW organs with tasks related to settlement of disputes, conferred by Article XIV (4) of the 
CWC. Following the beginning of implementation of the CSP decision C-SS-4/Dec.3, Russia 
and China proposed in the 23rd session of the CSP in November 2018 charging the EC with 
forming a group of experts, including specialists on international law, tasked with providing a 
reasoned conclusion whether attributive activities are in line with provisions of the 
convention231. The chair of the group was to prepare an outcome report and present it to the 
governing bodies of the OPCW with conclusions drawn by specialists enabling further 
discussion on the legal basis of launching an attribution mechanism in the OPCW. The joint 
proposal by Russia and China, entitled “Preserving the integrity of the Organisation for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons” was rejected in the CSP vote with 30 state parties voting 
for, and 82 against adopting the decision232. 
Article XIV (5) of the CWC and Article VII of the OPCW - UN relationship agreement 
stipulate that both the CSP and the EC are empowered, subject to authorisation from the UN 
GA, to request the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the 
scope of the activities of the organisation233. This process might aid in resolving the current 
division among the CWC state parties concerning the issue, by contributing to the 
authoritative sources to address the question of attribution within the scope of the OPCW 
activities. 
 
 
3.5 Activities outlined in decision C-SS-4.Dec.3 and the OPCW relationship with 
the United Nations  
 
The final research question of this study concerns with if the OPCW attribution of 
responsibility duties, as laid out in the decision, are in line with the division of OPCW tasks 
and the responsibilities, tasks and authority of the UN, and those of the UN SC in particular. 
Some criticism towards the CSP decision to direct fact-finding in alleged use cases into 
finding the perpetrators of CW use was based on views that the mechanism thus established 
encroaches on the tasks and duties, as well as the prerogatives of the UN234. These activities - 
perceived as identification of those responsible for CW use as well as taking punitive 
                                                                                                                                        
230 Article XIV (6), OPCW, 2005; also Herbach in Krutzsch et al. (2014) Article IX Consultations, B. Role of 
the part and negotiation history p.388 
231 OPCW CSP S23 NAT 2, 2018 
232 OPCW CSP S23, 2018. Report of the 23rd session of the Conference of the States Parties. 
233 Article VII (1): “…apart from any question(s) concerning the mutual relationship between the OPCW and the 
United Nations.” OPCW EC, 2000  
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measures towards them - were seen, aside from international courts, to be solely entrusted to 
the UN SC when member states of the UN are concerned.  
The coexistence and the mutually accepted relationship agreement, and the evolving working 
relationship of these two international organisations were examined in Chapter 3.1. 
Subsequently, the need of the OPCW to have the power to attribute CW use to the 
perpetrators were discussed from the point of view of the objectives and purpose of the treaty, 
as well as from the point of view of verification of compliance in cases of alleged use by a 
CWC state party, as set out in the treaty. In this chapter, we look into the mechanism 
established by decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 in the context of the OPCW relationship with the UN, 
in particular with the workings of the UN SC. 
In general, the arrangements mentioned in the operative paragraph 10 of the decision C-SS-
4/Dec.3 mandate creating a mechanism “to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical 
weapons in the SAR by identifying and reporting on all information potentially relevant to the 
origin of those chemical weapons.” This means collecting, processing and reporting 
information with the objective to attribute responsibility. As discussed in Chapter 3.2.2, it can 
be viewed that the mechanism established in the decision utilises the scope of fact-finding 
enabled by the CWC for cases of investigations of alleged use by a state party to the CWC. 
The text of the decision does not refer to, or the arrangements described in the decision cannot 
be seen to include, any actions of enforcement to those whom the CW use is attributed to 
through these activities. Apart from describing the OPCW organs, the UN SG and the UN 
mechanisms to which the mechanism is to report, the text of the decision does not take any 
stand on what happens after the fact-finding by the TS has reached information sufficient to 
reach conclusions on the identity of those responsible for CW use. This refers the decision-
making concerning the matters back to the powers and tasks of the OPCW organs, discussed 
in Chapter 3.3. 
Article XII of the CWC on Measures to redress as situation and to ensure compliance 
establishes the measures the CSP can take to redress and remedy any situation, which 
contravenes the provisions of the CWC. These include restricting or suspending the SP’s 
rights and privileges under the CWC until it undertakes the necessary action to conform with 
its obligations under the treaty. Paragraph 4 of Article XII of the CWC decrees that the CSP 
will, in cases of particular gravity, bring the issue to the attention of the UN GA and the UN 
SC. These provisions of Article XII deal with situations at which the internal treaty 
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compliance mechanism is essentially exhausted and it is left to the CWC SPs to take joint 
action, or to ‘fall back’ on the UN235.  
Under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN SC possesses an exceptional power to adopt 
acts that directly create legal obligations in general international law. These powers include a 
power to require a state to perform, or to refrain from performing, acts in order to maintain or 
restore international peace and security. The UN SC can also call upon states to impose 
sanctions or embargoes in the areas of economic relations, communications, transport and 
diplomatic contacts.236 It can be viewed that the mechanism established in the decision C-SS-
4/Dec.3, lacking any mention on specific sequelae or enforcement, does therefore not 
inherently overlap within the UN SC’s exclusive powers under the UN charter. 
The operative paragraphs of the decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 seem to take effort to link the 
mechanism of attribution created in the decision to the treaty-established framework of the 
OPCW-UN relationship, and especially the practical working tradition and arrangements 
between the two IOs, evolved in particular over the course of the Syrian conflict. C-SS-
4/Dec.3 (10)237 limits the identification of the perpetrators of CW use in the SAR, based on 
the mandate established by this decision, to cases for which the OPCW-UN JIM has not 
already issued a report, and further to those instances where the OPCW FFM determines or 
has determined that use or likely use occurred. These wordings suggest that the mechanism 
established by the decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 is not intended to investigate any CW use cases in 
the SAR that have not been already investigated by the FFM. Several CW attacks in the SAR 
have happened prior to 2014 when the OPCW FFM in SAR was started, excluding these from 
the investigations under the arrangements. Furthermore, based on the paragraph, the TS is not 
intending to reopen any cases from whom the OPCW-UN JIM has already reported.  
Finally, the text of the operative paragraph 12 of the decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 refers the findings 
collected by these investigations to the mechanisms already established within the UN 
framework and directed towards upholding accountability for CW use. In this, the OPCW TS 
is tasked to put in place appropriate measures to preserve and provide information to the IIIM 
                                            
235 Den Dekker in Krutzsch et al. (2014) Article XII B. Role of the part and negotiation history p.365 
236 Article XII (4), OPCW 2005; also Hall in McConville & Chui (2017) Ch 10, Researching international law p. 
274 
237 OPCW CSP SS 4 DEC 3 (2018) operative para 10: “…the Secretariat shall put in place shall put in place 
arrangements to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic by 
identifying and reporting on all information potentially relevant to the origin of those chemical weapons in those 
instances in which the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria determines or has determined that use or likely use 
occurred, and cases for which the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism has not issued a report; and decides 
also that the Secretariat shall provide regular reports on its investigations to the Council and to the United 
Nations Secretary-General for their consideration”. 
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established by the UN GA in resolution 71/248/2016238, as well as to any relevant 
investigatory entities established under UN. In this, should the immediate enforcement of the 
conclusions created by the OPCW attribution investigations fail for example in the UN SC, 
the CSP ensured that the technical expertise of the OPCW contributes to the investigation and 
prosecution of persons responsible for the most serious crimes under international law 
committed in the SAR. In 2019, the OPCW DG reported that the OPCW had signed a 
memorandum of understanding with the IIIM regarding the sharing of information produced 
by the OPCW IIT with the UN IIIM239. 
 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
4.1 The CWC state parties have highly opposing positions on the subject of the 
OPCW attributing responsibility for alleged CW use in Syria 
 
It is clear that the perceptions of the CWC state parties on the powers of the OPCW to 
attribute responsibility for CW use in the SAR as outlined in the decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 differ 
substantially. Those SPs opposing the established attribution mechanism see attribution of 
responsibility as something that is not at all implied within the treaty, neither within the 
decision-power of its implementing organisation OPCW. Those SPs in favour of the OPCW 
establishing a mechanism for attribution see it as an essential tool to fulfil the objectives and 
purpose of the treaty. In addition, the mandate for attribution is seen to be already conferred to 
the OPCW in the CWC treaty, as it is written. 
The continuing violations of the CWC by a state party to the treaty raises concerns about 
upholding the international norm prohibiting these weapons and the continuing success of 
universal chemical disarmament. In order to fulfil the purpose and objectives of the CWC, the 
OPCW has to be able to react to the changing world situation regarding newly emerging use 
of CWs and violations of the treaty. Nevertheless, after now taking decisive action, the OPCW 
faces accusations of overstepping its mandate, even being biased towards the western 
countries and using double standards. The division in the OPCW, previously very successful 
in maintaining neutral and consensus-based operation, seems unfortunate.  
OPCW SPs, especially those having opposing views towards the subject, have repeatedly 
invoked the principle of consensus-based decision-making since the attribution mechanism 
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was established by the decision C-SS-4/Dec.3240. While it is true that the practise of making 
consensus-based decisions is the preferred OPCW practise and strongly supported by the 
stipulations in Article VIII (18), the practise can be seen to create some hindrance to the work 
of the OPCW and the effective implementation of the CWC. Although taking majority 
decisions makes it more possible to adapt to the changing environment such as seen with 
decision C-SS-4/Dec.3, building such a tradition also limits possibilities of the OPCW to seek 
remedying division in SPs, as seen with the majority rejection of some SPs initiative to form a 
group of experts tasked with providing a conclusion whether attributive activities are in line 
with provisions of the convention241. Formal dispute settlement initiatives concerning 
application of the CWC as set out in Article XIV of the convention have not been started. The 
OPCW requesting the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on the scope of the activities of the 
organisation in this matter remains a possibility. 
 
 
4.2 The decision to create a mechanism to attribute responsibility for CW use in 
the SAR - amendment of the CWC treaty or simple implementation of the 
already invested powers?  
 
The CSP decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 to establish a OPCW mechanism for attribution of 
responsibility for CW use has been challenged from various perspectives, ranging from 
perceived procedural violations to claims for these activities requiring a formal amendment to 
the treaty, all the way to attribution of CW use by the OPCW threatening the balance of the 
international security mechanism and encroaching on the prerogatives of the UN SC. This 
study aimed to discuss the legal effects of decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 in the broader concept of 
powers of IOs, the relationship of the OPCW and the UN, as well as through examination of 
the CWC treaty text, against the backdrop of the principles of international law concerning 
treaties and international organisations. While the questions concerning small procedural 
modalities and the broad objectives and purposes of the organisation were somewhat easier to 
address, the treaty provisions on clarifying and resolving cases of suspected non-compliance 
and cases of alleged CW use, and the powers and tasks of the OPCW and its particular organs, 
comprise a detailed and colourful tapestry against which the arrangements created in decision 
C-SS-4/Dec.3 needed to be compared.  
                                            
240 see OPCW CSP S24 CHINA, 2019. China: Statement delivered by H.E. Mr Zhijun Wang, vice minister, 
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As stated in the Preamble of the treaty, the objective of the CWC is to exclude completely the 
possibility of the use of CWs. The objective of the treaty is reached through its 
implementation, for the purpose of which the OPCW was created. One of the distinctive 
hallmarks of the CWC, and the most significant part of its implementation, is its 
comprehensive mechanism for verification of compliance. Establishing compliance of a treaty 
state party in alleged use cases requires the power to conclude whether the state party has used 
CWs or not. Therefore, by necessary implication, the power to attribute CW use to a CWC 
state party should be well within the authority and scope of action of the OPCW. 
The CWC treaty text as a primary source proves that the CWC was intended to be well 
equipped to deal with situations of alleged use of CWs by a CWC state party. The mechanism 
of inspections dispatched by the OPCW DG as a tool for clarifying and resolving any 
questions concerning possible non-compliance to the treaty, as well as to investigate alleged 
use of CWs, is established in the CWC Articles IX and X and the Verification Annex. 
Concerning challenge inspections based on alleged use pursuant to the Article IX of the CWC, 
the OPCW must technically attribute the use of CWs to the SP in question through its 
investigative actions in order for the non-compliance by a SP (use of CWs) to be established. 
Explicit mentions of these investigations being used to attribute responsibility to the SP in 
question are limited to Part XI (D) (26) of the Verification Annex that mentions that the 
alleged use investigation process is to be utilised to identify the origin of any chemical 
weapons used, if possible.  
A challenge inspection, initiated by another CWC SP pursuant to the Article IX of the 
convention, is a detailed mechanism for clarifying and resolving whether alleged use of CWs 
by a CWC SP has occurred. Concerning the attribution of responsibility to the CW use in the 
SAR, now addressed through the establishment of an ad hoc mechanism devised in decision 
C-SS-4/Dec.3, a challenge inspection initiated by other CWC SP remains an unused option. 
Whether the outcome of such a challenge investigations established the non-compliance of the 
SP Syria in question, or found that the case is to be attributed to some other party operating in 
the conflict area, alleged use investigations following the core processes of the CWC would 
likely leave less room for political debate and division among the OPCW member states. 
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4.3 The OPCW attribution activities in the context of the international security 
mechanism 
 
Various CWC SPs have political stakes with the adoption and subsequent implementation of 
this decision, and it has therefore caused major division between the OPCW member states. 
The rationale concerning attribution and accountability in the alleged CW use cases over the 
last years in general has been characterised by large disagreements between world’s states and 
different parties in the related conflicts. Power politics and national interests have prevented 
the global security mechanism, especially the UN SC, from effectively handling the SAR 
crisis. It seems that for the time being, the UN SC will not address the CW use in Syria either. 
The collective international will to uphold the ban of CWs remains strong. Following the 4th 
SS of the CSP that adopted the decision C-SS-4/Dec.3, the UN GA on 5th December 2018 
adopted resolution A/RES/73/45242 that re-emphasised the unequivocal support of the UN GA 
for the decision of the OPCW DG to continue establishing the facts surrounding the 
allegations of the use of CWs in the SAR, and recalling decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 of the CSP, 
stressed the importance of its implementation. In the 74th session of the UN GA in December 
2019, the UN GA reiterated these statements in its resolution A/RES/74/40243. 
Practical aspects of the investigations of CW use incidents by the OPCW are a question that 
are often overshadowed by the legal and political debate. A major concern with conducting 
these investigations being for inspection teams to comprehensively and meaningfully reach 
sites of the alleged use and the available evidence, due to the security situation and ongoing 
fighting in the area. Under the Article 26 of the VCLT, every treaty is binding upon the parties 
to it and must be performed by them in good faith. The OPCW TS stated that the IIT was 
established based on expectations of full good-faith cooperation from all CWC SPs, in 
particular with the provision of relevant information and access to relevant places and 
persons244. 
The first report of the IIT, established by the OPCW DG pursuant to the implementation of 
the decision, is pending. Since the end of the mandate of OPCW-UN JIM, there has been no 
other international mechanism with dedicated attribution powers related to CW use in SAR. 
The lack of a viable and clear international attribution mechanism may encourage the use of 
CWs. As attribution can serve to deter the use of CWs, investigating CW use cases with the 
objective to attribute responsibility can be seen as the OPCW fulfilling its duty and mandate 
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to prevent the re-emergence of CWs. Furthermore, the decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 referred the 
findings of these activities to the relevant UN investigatory entities such as the IIIM, ensuring 
that the technical expertise of the OPCW contributes to the investigation and prosecution of 
persons responsible for the most serious crimes under international law committed in the 
SAR. 
Attribution as a process differs from accountability. Neither the OPCW-UN JIM was, or the 
OPCW IIT, established following decision C-SS-4/Dec.3, is tasked with determining legal 
liability. Additionally, the CWC is treaty, and the subject of any measures taken under the 
convention to address CWC non-compliance would be the CWC state parties. The United 
Nations Security Council can take enforcement measures addressing a threat to the 
international peace and security. The question of eventual individual accountability for CWC 
use is another question, as prosecuting individuals responsible of CW use under international 
or national criminal law requires different, judicial procedures. The UN SC could refer the 
situation of Syria to the ICC, exercising its Chapter VII powers, another option being the UN 
SC creating an ad hoc international criminal tribunal for CW use in Syria. National courts 
could also carry out prosecutions, but national jurisdictions are dependent on having 
applicable and relevant legislation in place, as well as the ability and will to investigate 
complex crimes that may require extradition and judicial assistance agreements.245 However, 
these actions of the UN SC would again need the concurring vote of the five permanent 
members. 
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